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IN LIEU OF MORAL RIGHTS FOR IPWRONGED MUSIC VOCALISTS:
PERSONHOOD THEORY, MORAL RIGHTS,
AND THE WPPT REVISITED
©TUNEEN E. CHISOLM†
INTRODUCTION
Copyright law in the United States is failing music
performers,1 and most specifically, music vocalists.
The
utilitarian/economic incentive-based copyright regime not only
minimizes the creative contribution of music performers2 and
subjects the exclusive rights to exploit their works to an everwidening range of fair use exceptions, but it also disregards the
personhood interests of most actual creators entirely.3 That
disregard of personhood interests affects music vocalists more
than authors of other copyrightable works because “a voice is as
distinctive and personal as a face. The human voice is one of the
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1
See David Dante Troutt, I Own Therefore I Am: Copyright, Personality, and
Soul Music in the Digital Commons, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
373, 391–95 (2010) (focusing on personality interests in providing a written tour of
“the history of African-American musical authorship to show how, like canaries in a
coalmine, the appropriative harms committed against them were facilitated by the
structure of copyright law and repeated against other musical authors”).
2
See Tuneen E. Chisolm, Whose Song Is That? Searching For Equity and
Inspiration For Music Vocalists Under the Copyright Act, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 274,
277–78, 291–305 (2017) (discussing the disparate treatment of music vocalists under
copyright law, as compared to music composers, regarding authorship, ownership,
fixation requirements, and available protections).
3
Troutt, supra note 1, at 377.
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most palpable ways identity is manifested. [And thus,] especially
[as to . . . ] a singer of renown, [t]he singer manifests herself in
the song.”4
An undergirding problem exacerbating the lack of
personhood rights is that the U.S. copyright regime aims to
maximize distribution of and access to creative works for societal
benefits, in exchange for economic rewards to copyright owners,
which are assumed to be sufficient incentives for authors to
create.5 But owners and authors are not necessarily identical.
That nonidentity leads to inequitable results for music
performers who, as a group, lose control of when, how, in what
context, and by whom their recorded performances are used,
because the sound recording copyright is the only available
copyright protection for their performances, and typically their
record labels own that copyright.6
Both economic7 and noneconomic consequences flow from the
inability to manage and control the presentation of their works to
the public that consumes their works. This Article focuses on the
noneconomic consequences primarily for music vocalists,
although non-composer musicians who suffer similar loss of
control of their recordings and related consequences may also
benefit from the arguments presented.
As Professor David Dante Troutt so aptly stated: “we often
know an interest by the harms to it,” and “the measure of what is
gained by copyright ownership is what is not lost to coerced
control, unauthorized adaption or infringement.”8 And so, let us
begin with the harms to music vocalists.

4

Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing a new
tort of misappropriation of voice under California law, applicable to commercial use
of widely known and deliberately imitated distinctive voices).
5
See Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532,
1532–37 (1990) (challenging this dual purpose of copyright as “an unsuccessful
attempt to impose socialist ideals upon a capitalistic framework,” and arguing that
“if we really are interested in the artists’ actual needs, we should recognize the
European concept of moral rights, which preserve the bond between the artist and
her work”) (citations omitted).
6
Chisolm, supra note 2, at 378, 291–305.
7
See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Comp., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir.
1976). A clear economic consequence to the allocation of sound recording copyright
ownership and control is that music performers enjoy little to no passive income
generation from the exploitation of their recorded performances. See Chisolm, supra
note 2, at 315–20 (2017) (discussing sources of passive income for composers versus
recording artists, and comparisons of the two).
8
Troutt, supra note 1, at 391–92 (emphasis added).
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Amid the 2016 presidential election campaigns, one news
report raised a question about music use in campaigns that has
been a recurring issue in every presidential election for the past
two decades: “do bands have any recourse to stop politicians
[from using their music], aside from making public statements
and hoping to shame them into pulling the songs from their
campaigns?”9 The Rolling Stones, Sting, Adele, John Cougar
Mellencamp, Tom Petty, Van Halen, Bon Jovi, ABBA, Survivor,
Neil Young, Aerosmith’s Steven Tyler, Jackson Browne, Sam &
Dave’s Sam Moore, Talking Heads’ David Byrne, and SomaliCanadian rapper K’naan are all among the growing list of
recording artists who have taken issue with politicians playing
“their songs” for campaign purposes.10 The answer to the
question, as the news article correctly suggested, is “both yes and
no.”11 The “yes” or “no” may depend upon “how the songs are
used”12 for a songwriter/composer who owns or controls the
copyright in the underlying music composition of the song at
issue.13
But for recording artists who are non-composer
9
Travis M. Andrews, The Rolling Stones Demand Trump Stop Using its Music
at Rallies, but Can the Band Actually Stop Him?, WASH. POST (May 5, 2016, 9:46
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/05/05/the-rollingstones-demand-trump-stop-using-its-music-at-rallies-but-can-the-band-actuallystop-him/?utm_term=.b26fdc78f53e.
10
Id.; Eveline Chao, Stop Using My Songs: 35 Artists Who Fought Politicians
Over Their Music, ROLLING STONE (July 8, 2015), http://www.rollingstone.com/
music/lists/stop-using-my-song-34-artists-who-fought-politicians-over-their-music20150708/knaan-vs-mitt-romney-20150629; see also David C. Johnston, The Singer
Did Not Approve This Message: Analyzing the Unauthorized Use of Copyrighted
Music in Political Advertisements in Jackson Browne v. John McCain, 27 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687, 688–89 (2010) (detailing various artists’ demands regarding
public performances of songs by presidential candidates in each election between
1996 and 2008).
11
Andrews, supra note 9.
12
Id.
13
See, e.g., Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(succeeding on claim for infringement of composition copyright, where politician
Charles DeVore’s revised lyrics to Don Henley’s for use in his campaign ads and fair
use defense did not apply). Blanket licenses from a performing rights society may
allow legal use over the objections of the composer, leaving the decision to stop or not
to the politician. Andrews, supra note 9. In 2012, campaign representatives for then
presidential candidate Mitt Romney claimed to have blanket licenses from ASCAP
and BMI to play the song “Wavin’ Flag” at a rally, in response to objections from
rapper K’naan. Chao, supra note 10. Reportedly, the rapper “was deluged with
Twitter messages accusing him of selling out to a conservative politician. The
musician threatened legal action against the Romney campaign, explaining, ‘I'm for
immigrants. I'm for poor people, and they don't seem to be what he's endorsing.’ He
also added that he would ‘happily grant the Obama campaign use of my song
without prejudice.’ ” Id. Despite the valid licenses, Romney ceased use. Id.; see also
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musicians or non-composer vocalists, the answer is simply no.
That “no” applies not only with respect to use of recorded
performances for political campaigns, but also to their use for
soundtracks, advertising, sampling, and many other uses that
may conflict with the recording artist’s personal values, beliefs,
or artistic preferences.14
Consider next a scenario in which an unproven female
vocalist, barely the age of twenty and devoid of bargaining power,
enters into a recording contract that requires assignment of all
copyrights in her recorded performances to the record label. The
young woman’s career flounders at first, but just when the label
is ready to drop her, she has a hit record, her contract is
renewed, and her career takes off making her an international,
chart-topping star. Years later, her career is abruptly halted
when she is bound to a chair, gagged, raped, and tortured at
knife-point for two and a half hours by an unknown assailant
who breaks into her hotel room during a concert tour. An allmale jury awards her $2.5 million on claims against the hotel,
but she suffers from continuing trauma, depression, and suicidal
ideation. Then, despite public knowledge of her violent rape and
continuing mental condition, her record label licenses two of her
signature hit songs for use in a film riddled with sex,
prostitution, suicide, and rape. A federal district court holds
that, because her recording contract transferred the copyrights in
her sound recordings to the record label, there is no claim the
vocalist can bring and nothing she can do to obtain relief from
the licensed use of her recorded vocal performances in a film she
finds objectionable and even emotionally devastating. This
scenario is not fiction; it all happened to singer Connie Francis.15
In addition to political uses and soundtrack uses, there are
numerous examples of commercial advertising uses and music
sampling uses of vocalists’ performances without their
contemporaneous permission. So what are the harms?

James C. McKinley Jr., G.O.P. Candidates Are Told, Don’t Use the Verses, It’s Not
Your Song, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/
arts/music/romney-and-gingrich-pull-songs-after-complaints.html.
14
Troutt, supra note 1, at 422–23.
15
See Franconero v. Universal Music Corp., 02 Civ. 1963, 2003 WL 22990060,
*1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2003); CONNIE FRANCIS, WHO’S SORRY Now 107, 117, 253–
267 & 317–320; (1984); Max H. Segel, Jury Awards Connie Francis $2.5 Million in
Westbury Rape, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 1976), https://www.nytimes.com/1976/07/02/
archives/jury-awards-connie-francis-25-million-in-westbury-rape.html.
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The harms can be characterized as objectionable associations
and ideological conflicts arising from unbridled exploitation of
feature vocal performances, which arguably are among the most
personal works of authorship of all. It would seem a basic,
almost common-sense imperative that a person’s voice captured
in a recording is necessarily an extension of individual
personhood worthy of legal protection from uses and, more
specifically, from harmful associations, not personally authorized
by the vocalist. After all, courts have applied tort law and unfair
competition law to prohibit the mere imitation of distinctive
voices in advertisements, based on theories of false endorsement
and misappropriation of voice.16 Where, then, is the protection
for the music vocalist against the unchecked use of their actual
voice, as embodied in sound recordings, for: political campaigns
by politicians whom the artist does not support17; soundtracks to
films or sampling in other music with objectionable content;
advertising campaigns for products and other causes that are
contrary to the artist’s personal values and beliefs; and even
unimagined objectionable uses such as music torture?18
Protection against those uses generally fails because the making
of the sound recording was authorized by the artist, with no
retained right of control as to its subsequent use.
Music vocalists would have some redress if U.S. copyright
law specifically granted a moral right of integrity, which gives
authors some ability to control the context in which their creative
works are used, even after transfer of their economic interests in
the work.19 But despite obligations to grant a moral right of

16

See Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1021 (3d Cir. 2008); Waits v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1107 (9th Cir. 1992) (false endorsement and
misappropriation of voice); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that “when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known
and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated
what is not theirs and have committed a tort in California”).
17
Unwanted associations with political campaigns and other causes may also
cause economic harm if the artist’s fans perceive the artist to have “sold out” or
otherwise condoned principles associated with the politician or cause, that are
antithetical to principles espoused by the artists, or those held by the fan-base.
18
See Anna J. Mitran, Note, Facing the Music: Moral Intellectual Property
Rights As A Solution To Artist Outrage About Music Torture, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
505, 506–08 (2016) (citing various reports on the use of music torture as an
interrogation technique for detainees).
19
See, e.g., Tanja Makovec Petrik, Moral Rights of Composers: The Protection of
Attribution and Integrity Available to Musicians in the European Union and The
United States, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 359, 374–80 (2012)
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integrity under international treaties, such as the World
Intellectual
Property
Organization’s
Performances
and
Phonograms Treaty, which is specific to music vocalists and other
performers, and under the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, which applies to other authors, the
United States has steadfastly resisted an explicit grant of moral
rights, leaving all but a select subset of visual artists to depend
upon alternative legal theories for redress in domestic disputes.20
Increasingly, the alternative legal theories have fallen short
of standing in the gap for the unavailable moral rights,
particularly as it concerns non-composer recording artists. Case
law has whittled them down, substantially. For decades, various
scholars have acknowledged the gap in protection and argued for
a legislative grant of some set of express moral rights in the
United States, but most of the scholarly literature pays little
attention, if any, to music vocalists.21 This Article takes a
(providing a comparative analysis of the case outcomes for right-of-integrity-based
lawsuits in the United States, France, and Spain).
20
Notably, even after finally becoming a signatory to the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works—which mandates that signatories
provide a right of integrity and right of attribution for creators of specific artistic
works, but excludes musical performances from the definition of such works—the
United States opted to grant limited moral rights to only a subset of visual artists
via the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012); Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990, title VI of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128 (1990); Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, art. 2(1) & art. 6bis(1), Sept. 9, 1886, 102 Stat. 2853,
828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris on July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
21
See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The Most Moral of Rights: The Right to Be
Recognized as the Author of One’s Work, 8 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 44, 72
(2016); Petrik, supra note 19, at 359 (arguing for a “limited, but explicit, [] moral
rights protection for musical composers”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution
Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and Section
43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 1027 (2002) (arguing for “adoption of non-waivable,
explicit, and broadly defined right of attribution” for all authors of copyrightable
works); Lacey, supra note 5, at 1537 (proposing moral rights for writers and visual
artists); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 72–91 (1985) (discussing, prior to the United
States’ accession to the Berne Convention, how the Copyright Act of 1976 could be
amended to explicitly recognize “an American variation of the moral right doctrine”);
cf. Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar “Gap”, 2007 UTAH
L. REV. 659, 660, 700 (2007) (examining failure of the “patchwork” of alternative
theories to moral rights, and proposing amendment of Lanham Act § 45 to define
“origin” as used in § 43(a) to apply to authors of copyrighted works); Robert C. Bird
& Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Moral Rights in the United States and the United
Kingdom:
Challenges and Opportuities under the U.K.’s New Performances
Regulations, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 213, 276–81 (2006) (considering how online music
performance could influence amendment of VARA or enactment of separate
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different approach and argues for amendments to copyright law
which would serve the interests of music vocalists, short of an
explicit grant of moral rights.
The first proposed amendment would provide a licensable,
but otherwise inalienable copyright in a music vocalist’s fixed
performance as an “applied composition” that coexists with, but
is separate from, the sound recording copyright; the second
amendment would restrict the permissible derivative works from
a sound recording to use of the integrated whole with music
vocalist consent.22 Challenging the ingrained notion that the
only two copyrights at issue for nondramatic music are those for
music compositions and sound recordings, this author first
proposed the amendments in a recent article focused on the
economic inequities that plague music vocalists as a result of
limited copyright protections and copyright control issues.23 That
article noted that such amendments were “a necessary precursor
to remedying the music vocalist’s lack of control over creative
works that are essentially an extension of their person,” but
reserved the argument regarding personhood theory and moral
rights for another day.24 This Article takes up that argument.
Professor Troutt urged that “the personality interest should
be elevated from its prior lurking status and paired with the
dominant economic interest.”25 The amendments proposed in
this Article accomplish that aim.
The Introduction of this Article has identified some of the
noneconomic harms of concern. Part I summarizes and compares
copyright ownership, control, and existing protections for authors
of music compositions and sound recordings under the Copyright
Act. It also summarizes pertinent music industry practices that
impact third party use of recorded vocalist performances. Part II
provides a foundation for understanding the nature of legal
protections for creative works and the philosophical
underpinnings of copyright law and moral rights, comparing
utilitarianism and natural rights theory to personhood theory. It
also provides a brief explanation of moral rights. Part III looks

legislation to extend moral rights to music composers and musicians); Patrick G.
Zabatta, Note, Moral Rights and Musical Works: Are Composers Getting Berned?, 43
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1095, 1101–02 (1992).
22
Chisolm, supra note 2, at 281–82, 330–33.
23
Id. passim.
24
Id. at 333, 330 n.264.
25
Troutt, supra note 1, at 434.
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at the United States’ obligations to music vocalists under the
WPPT and discusses how pertinent U.S. legislative actions
driven by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works have worked to widen the gap in protections
for music vocalists. Part IV returns to discussion of the harms, to
illustrate how claims sounding in contract, tort, and unfair
competition
(specifically
trademark
infringement,
false
designation of origin, and false endorsement) have become
increasingly ineffective as paths to redress of harms to
personhood-based rights, generally and, in particular, for music
vocalists. Finally, Part V details the proposed amendments and
demonstrates how they would provide the necessary redress, in
reasonable alignment with the utilitarian/economic incentive aim
of U.S. copyright law and the intent of the WIPO’s Performances
and Phonograms Treaty.
I.

A.

U.S. MUSIC COPYRIGHT AND PERTINENT INDUSTRY
PRACTICES

Current U.S. Copyright for Nondramatic Music-Related
Works

U.S. copyright protections apply to “original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” in eight
categories, only two of which concern non-dramatic music-related
works: “musical works, including any accompanying words” and
sound recordings.26 Pursuant to § 106 of the Act, the copyright
owner obtains a bundle of exclusive rights to do or to authorize
others to do the following: reproduce the work, prepare derivative
works, distribute the work to the public, perform and display the
work publicly—these two being inapplicable to sound
recordings—and, as to sound recordings only, perform the work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.27
1.

Music Compositions

The term “musical works” is consistently construed to refer
to the musical composition, consisting of music score and lyrics; it
does not include performances.28 The owner of a copyright in a
26

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (enumerating works of authorship).
Id. § 106.
28
Congress intentionally did not define the term “musical works,” but instead
relied upon its “fairly settled meaning.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976), as
27
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musical composition—typically the composer(s) and/or publishing
company as assignee—obtains all exclusive rights provided by
§ 106, except the right to perform the work publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission, which is included in the more general
right to perform the work publicly.29
The exclusive right to make and distribute phonorecords of
music compositions is subject to a compulsory mechanical license
upon compliance with statutory provisions set forth in § 115 of
the Act.30 That compulsory license is what allows other recording
artists to make “covers” of a song, after the composer authorizes
release of a first recording to the public.31 The compulsory
license also allows the cover artist to adapt the musical
arrangement of the work “to the extent necessary to conform it to
the style or manner of interpretation of the performance
involved,” but prohibits “chang[ing] the basic melody or
fundamental character of the work.”32 Some have suggested that
this qualification of the compulsory licensing scheme is an
express codification of the moral right of integrity, but the
statutory limitation serves the interests of the copyright owner,
not the artistic interests of the author.33
2.

Sound Recordings

“Sound recordings” are defined as “works that result from
the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds,
[excluding] the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they
are embodied.”34 The sound recording copyright is intentionally
limited. The owner of a sound recording copyright obtains the
exclusive rights to copy, prepare derivative works, and distribute
copies or phonorecords to the public, as well as the right to
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666-67. See also U.S. Copyright OFF.,
Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices § 101, § 802.1 (3d ed. 2017),
https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf
[hereinafter
Copyright
Compendium] (“For purposes of copyright registration, musical works (which are
also known as musical compositions) are original works of authorship, consisting of
music and any accompanying words.”).
29
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (limiting the right to publicly perform a work through
digital audio transmission to sound recordings).
30
Id. § 115.
31
Id. § 115(a)(1).
32
Id. § 115(a)(2).
33
See Petrik, supra note 19, at 370.
34
17 U.S.C. § 101.
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perform the work publicly by means of digital transmission.35
Due to the absence of the more general right of public
performance from the sound recording exclusive rights bundle,
the owner of the sound recording copyright is unable to prevent
terrestrial broadcasters, restaurants, bars, stadiums, and other
public forums from playing the sound recording once the first
record has been sold.36
3.

Vocal Performances

Currently, a music vocalist’s performance is treated as
merely a contribution to the sound recording; it is not currently
recognized as a copyrightable work separate and apart from the
sound recording.37
This is so, even though the vocalist’s
performance otherwise meets the criteria for an original creative
work and, in fact, provides the basis for the vocalist’s recognized
authorship of the sound recording that captures the
performance.38

35

The digital performance right was first added to the copyright bundle for
sound recordings under the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act in
1995, and later expanded by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (the
“DMCA”). Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
10439, § 2, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified at 17 U.S.C.§ 106(6) (2012)); Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 402, 405, 112 Stat. 2860,
2888, 2890-2902 (1998). Due to the expanded digital performance right, all digital
broadcasters—such as iHeart Radio, Pandora, Spotify, and other subscription and
non-subscription interactive digital music providers—must pay royalties to the
sound recording copyright holders. Non-interactive internet radio stations can
qualify for a compulsory license under § 114 of the Act and pay a statutory fee.
Interactive digital transmission providers must negotiate their royalty rate. For the
terms of qualification for compulsory digital transmission licensing, see generally
17 U.S.C. § 114.
36
See, e.g., RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940).
37
Copyright Compendium, supra note 28, at § 803.3A (“Examples of
performance authorship include playing an instrument, singing, speaking, or
creating other sounds that are captured and fixed in the sound recording. Individual
performance authorship may be claimed only if the sound recording is comprised
solely of an individual performance that is sufficiently creative. If a performance is
part of an integrated work (e.g., a band performance), the Office will not accept a
claim in an individual performer’s contribution to that work.”).
38
For an in-depth discussion of why, once fixed, music vocalist performances
should be treated as copyrightable works capable of subsisting on their own, but
separate from the sound recording, see Chisolm, supra note 2, at 291–300.
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B. Authorship, Ownership, and Copyright Control Issues
While the music composition copyright vests in the
composer(s) of the music score and any lyrics as author(s) under
§ 201(a), authorship is not statutorily specified for sound
recordings, and there is substantial ambiguity around whether a
record label may claim author status under the work-for-hire
doctrine.39 Certainly the recording artist is an author, by virtue
of his or her copyrightable performance. But, the legislative
history leaves the door open to claims of authorship by whomever
is “responsible for setting up the recording session, capturing and
electronically processing the sounds, and compiling and editing
them to make the final . . . recording,” which extends authorship
to sound engineers and producers, and, arguably, even record
labels employing such persons.40
This disparate treatment of music composer and music
performer authorship under the Copyright Act leads to
differences in copyright exploitation control.
1.

Controlling Music Composition Copyright Exploitation

Composers generally control exploitation of music
compositions via their chosen music publisher and licensing
agents.41 The music publishing company may be wholly owned
by the composer, in which case the composer effectively retains
full control of the copyright and all royalties from its exploitation
as a writer-publisher. Or, the music publishing company may be
an affiliate of a record label, in which case the composer may (a)
co-own the copyright with the music publishing company or
transfer the copyright completely, (b) share or cede control of
administration, and (c) share royalties from exploitation of the
copyright.42
39
See id. at 288–90. The work-made-for-hire doctrine provides that, absent a
signed written agreement to the contrary, an employer is deemed the author of a
work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment; in addition, “a work
specially ordered or commissioned” for any of the ten uses specified in § 101 of the
Copyright Act will also be deemed a work-made-for-hire if the parties expressly
agree in a written instrument signed by them that it shall be considered as such.
40
See H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 5 (1971), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
1570.
41
Generally, the composer assigns the composition copyright to a music
publishing company for administration of rights, which includes, among other
things, seeking opportunities for exploitation of the composition and issuing licenses
for use. See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC
BUSINESS 222 (9th ed. 2017).
42
See id. at 222–23, 304–05.
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The three vehicles for controlling the use of music
compositions and generating royalties are mechanical licensing
and non-dramatic performance rights licensing, the primary two,
and “everything else.” Mechanical licenses—for the right to
record a song and distribute the recording in any format—may be
issued by the music publisher directly or, more likely, by a
mechanical licensing agent such as the Harry Fox Agency, which
also issues most mechanical licenses for covers.43 Non-dramatic
public performance licensing covers everything from playing
songs on radio and television, to karaoke and jukeboxes, to
playing music in various public spaces, including restaurants,
elevators, bars, stadiums, and live concerts.44 Performing rights
societies (“PRSs”), such as ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, monitor
public performance of compositions and manage royalties
generated from PRS blanket licenses issued to third parties for
the right to play all songs that are represented by the specific
The music publishing company handles all other
PRS.45
licensing, including for use of the composition in domestic films,
television and radio commercials, video games, webcasting,
podcasting, and video streaming, 46 as well as grand performance
rights use in dramatic works, such as plays and operas.
2.

Controlling Sound Recording Copyright Exploitation

As a direct result of the copyright ownership allocation
achieved through express written assignment required in most
recording agreements, the record label, not the recording artist,
controls the use of the sound recordings that embody the

43
The Harry Fox Agency is a popular clearing house for this purpose. See HFA:
A
Legacy
of
Trust,
A
Commitment
to
New
Technology,
HFA,
https://www.harryfox.com/find_out/aboutus.html.
44
See, e.g., ASCAP Publisher Agreements and Writer Agreements ¶ 9, ASCAP,
https://www.ascap.com/about/join/membership-agreement (last visited Oct. 23, 2018)
(defining “public performance” as “vocal, instrumental and/or mechanical renditions
and representations in any manner or by any method whatsoever, including
transmissions by radio and television broadcasting stations, transmission by
telephony and/or ‘wired wireless’; and/or reproductions of performances and
renditions by means of devices for reproducing sound recorded in synchronism or
timed relation with the taking of motion pictures”).
45
Music publishers may affiliate with one or more of the PRSs for non-exclusive
administration of the publisher’s catalog of copyright interests, while composers may
individually affiliate with the PRS of their choice, for non-exclusive administration
of all their composition copyrights. PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 238–39.
46
See id. at 244–59.
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recording artist’s performance.47
That said, while digital
performance use for interactive internet services can be
negotiated, there is no control to be had over digital transmission
public performances by non-interactive internet service providers
that qualify for the compulsory license under § 114 of the Act.
SoundExchange, an independent digital performance rights
organization, functions as a monitoring service for public
performances of the sound recording by digital transmission; it
collects and distributes the royalties paid, but, in contrast to the
PRSs which issue blanket licenses, SoundExchange does not
control which recordings are played by which third parties.48
Record labels also control licensing of the masters for the use
of a sound recording in a film, television show, commercial, or
video game.49 In some cases, depending upon the degree of
bargaining power the recording artist had at the time of the
recording contract negotiations, the recording contract may
require the record label to seek the artist’s consent for certain
uses of the sound recordings produced under the recording
contract. But, more often than not, the record label has full
control over the issuance of master licenses.
3.

Required Copyright Licenses for Third Party Use of Songs

The most common harms to personhood rights for music
vocalists are caused by use for objectionable political
associations, commercials, soundtracks, and derivative musical
47

Howard Cockrill, Tuning the Dial on Internet Radio: The DPRA, the DMCA &
the General Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 9 INTELL. PROP. L.
BULL. 103, 105 (2005). See also Richard Salmon, Recording Contracts Explained,
SOUND ON SOUND (Apr. 2007), https://www.soundonsound.com/music-business/
recording-contracts-explained.
48
Rather, it collects royalties due from service providers who stream music
content, allocates the fees collected to recordings based upon frequency of song play,
and then pays out those royalties, with 45% going to the featured recording artist(s),
5% to a fund for non-featured artists, and 50% to the sound recording copyright
owner. See About Digital Royalties, SOUND EXCHANGE, https://www.sound
exchange.com/artist-copyright-owner/digital-royalties/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).
49
The owners of sound recording copyrights grant synchronization licenses
required for use in such works. Resources & Learning: Licensing, RECORDING
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, https://www.riaa.com/resources-learning/
licensing/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2018). Because record labels are the owners of such
sound recording copyrights, they possess the right to grant such licenses. See
Cockrill, supra note 47. See also Salmon, supra note 47. See also I’m Making a Short
Film And Want to Add Music, But How am I Supposed to Contact Famous Artists to
Get Permission?, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE, https://copyrightalliance.org/ca_faq_post/immaking-short-film-want-add-music-supposed-contact-famous-artists-get-permission/
(last visited Oct. 23, 2018).
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works and sound recordings. Accordingly, this section provides a
summary of the interplay between music copyright licensing for
pertinent third-party use.
Playing a song or performing a song live at political
campaign rallies in public forums requires a public performance
license for the use of the underlying composition, generally
obtainable from the composition copyright owner’s PRS.50 No
license from the sound recording copyright owner is required to
play the song, because there is no non-digital transmission public
performance right included in the sound recording copyright
bundle; live performance of the song does not implicate the sound
recroding copyright at all.
Playing a song or performing a song live during a live
television or radio broadcast requires a public performance
license for the use of the underlying composition; no license from
the sound recording copyright owner is required for the reasons
stated directly above.51
Playing a song or performing a song live during a noninteractive internet broadcast requires a public performance
license for the use of the underlying composition; no direct
license from the sound recording copyright owner is required
because the digital license for such use of the recording is
compulsory.52
Using a song in a television commercial, television show, or
motion picture film requires a mechanical license for
reproduction and distribution of the underlying composition and
a sync license for synchronization of the composition with the
visual component of the commercial; if—and only if—a
copyrighted sound recording is used, a master license for the use
of the sound recording is also required.

50

For example, the McCain-Palin campaign used the song “My Hero” in
McCain’s 2008 presidential run, and asserted PRS blanket licenses in response to
objections from musician-songwriter Dave Grohl, who was an Obama supporter.
Chao, supra note 10. Palin continued to use the song “Barracuda” as her theme song,
despite the cease-and-desist letter from the composer-performers, asserting she had
a blanket license. Id. See also Resources & Learning: For Political Campaigns,
RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, https://www.riaa.com/resourceslearning/for-political-campaigns/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2018).
51
Joy Butler, Music Licensing: The Difference Between Public Performance and
Synchronization Licenses, COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CENTER (May 16, 2017),
http://www.copyright.com/blog/music-licensing-public-performance-licensesynchronization/. See also Cockrill, supra note 47.
52
Cockrill, supra note 47, at 105.
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Using a sound recording in another sound recording, such as
for sampling or a recorded mash-up, requires a mechanical
license from the composer for reproduction and distribution of
the underlying composition, and a master license from the sound
recording copyright owner, for copying and distribution of the
master and use to create a derivative work.53
II. THE NATURE OF LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CREATIVE WORKS
The objective of this Part is to provide a foundational
framework for discussion and argument regarding the gap in
protection of music vocalists’ rights from a personhood
perspective on the justification for copyright law, as well as for
the justification for inalienability of a right aimed at filling that
gap, subject only to contemporaneous license. The focus here is
on the concepts and terminology of the philosophical
justifications for copyright law. Intentionally omitted—as beyond
the scope of this Article—is examination of whether a particular
ideology is attributable to or can be extrapolated from Kantian or
Hegelian ideology regarding tangible property rights or authorial
rights in literary works and artworks.54

53

Id.
Numerous scholars assert that, as they relate to personhood justifications for
intellectual property, monist copyright theory in the civil law context is derived from
the works of Immanuel Kant, while the dualist theory in the civil law context is
derived from the works of Georg Hegel. See, e.g., Troutt, supra note 1, at 389
(Hegelian theory acknowledges “the unique character of creation that goes beyond
the establishment of exclusive rights incident to the mere execution of labor”);
Robert Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the
Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1977 (2006); Bird & Ponte, supra note
21, at 213–14, 218 (philosophies of Hegel support the notion that property rights
that “promote self-expression and human development” are superior rights of
“paramount importance”); Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictions and the
Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental Copyright Law,
12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 20–21 (1992); Lacey, supra note 5, at 1541–42
(“Intellectual property theorists following Hegel’s and Kant’s thoughts on the
subject, contend that the personhood theory of property is especially true when the
property is a work of art.”). Others criticize the conventional wisdom regarding the
Kantian and Hegelian philosophical bases for the relationship between personhood
theory and copyright. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Personhood Revisited,
FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP AT PENN LAW, PAPER 423 (Sept. 18, 2012),
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/423; Kim Treiger-Bar-Am,
Kant on Copyright: Rights of Transformative Authorship, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 1059, 1071–74 (2008) (arguing that conventional reliance on Kantian theory to
support the concept of authors’ property-based personality rights is misplaced).
54
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Philosophical Justifications: Natural Rights, Utilitarianism,
and Personhood

“Two main functions of any property theory are the general
justification of property rights and their delineation.”55 The
discourse on justifications for intellectual property centers on
three theories that serve as the dominant philosophical
underpinnings for tangible property rights: labor-desert or
natural rights theory, utilitarian theory, and personhood
theory.56 Each is discussed in turn.
1.

Natural Rights/Desert Theory

Natural rights or desert theory derives from John Locke’s
basic premise regarding tangible property that one ought to reap
the fruits of his labor and “ ‘whenever one mingles his effort with
the raw stuff of the world, any resulting product ought—simply
ought—to be his.’ ”57 With respect to intellectual property, the
natural rights theory provides that “ ‘a man’s right to the produce
of his brain is equally valid with his right to the produce of his
hands.’ ”58 Discussing copyright law in his treatise, Blackstone
extended Lockean theory beyond mere possession justification
into the realm of control:
When a man, by the exertion of his rational powers has
produced an original work, he seems to clearly have a right to
dispose of that identical work as he pleases, and any attempt to
vary the disposition he has made of it, appears to be an invasion
of that right [of property].59

55
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958
(1982).
56
See id. at 958 (identifying Lockean labor-desert theory and utilitarian theory
as “the most prevalent traditional lines of liberal property theory,” and discussing
personhood theory as a third strand); see also Troutt, supra note 1, at 381–89
(discussing utility and personality as the theoretical framework for property rights
in music).
57
Lacey, supra note 5, at 1539 (citing J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government,
in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ch. 5 §§ 27-30. (P. Laslett ed. 1960) and Frank
I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1204 (1967)).
58
Id. (citing H. SPENSER, SOCIAL STATICS 68 (rev. ed. 1896)).
59
Id. at 1539–40 (citing 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 405).
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Utilitarianism

Utilitarian theory focuses on maximization of social
welfare.60 As stated in Part I, U.S. copyright law and patent law
is primarily focused on maximizing public access to intellectual
property and spawning additional works for social benefit;
exclusive rights to be exploited for economic benefits to the
copyright owner are the means of achieving that primary
objective.61 The emphasis on social utility is evident in the
constitutionally sanctioned power of Congress to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings . . . .”62 It is further evidenced in the copyright context
by the statutory fair use doctrine and the long list of other
exceptions to a United States copyright owner’s exclusive rights
to exploit his or her works.63 The inclusion of economic rewards
to the copyright owner is secondary, as evidenced by various
Supreme Court opinions.64 Thus, U.S. copyright law is based
primarily upon utilitarianism, and secondarily upon labor-desert
or natural rights theory.
3.

Personhood or Personality Theory

Personhood theory “focuses on personal embodiment or selfconstitution in terms of ‘things.’ ”65 In her article exploring the
relationship between property and personhood, and “how the
personhood perspective can help decide specific disputes between
rival claimants,” Professor Margaret Jane Radin explained:
“Once we admit that a person can be bound up with an external

60

See Radin, supra note 55, at 958.
See also Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in 2
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, ch. 19 at 1482. (A. Mitchell Polinmsky &
Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
62
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
63
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–122 (2012). All exclusive rights for any copyrighted work
are subject to the “fair use” limitation set forth in § 107 of the Act. Copyright fair use
essentially exempts certain unauthorized uses from copyright infringement liability.
Applicability of the defense is determined by consideration of the purpose and
character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and
substantiality of the work used, and the impact of the use on the potential market or
value of the work.
64
See Netanel, supra note 54, at 9–10.
65
Radin, supra note 55, at 958.
61
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‘thing’ in some constitutive sense, we can argue that by virtue of
this connection the person should be accorded broad liberty with
respect to control over that ‘thing.’ ”66
Personhood or personality theory as a justification for
intellectual property, then, is based on the premise that property
which is an extension or embodiment of the individual’s
personality, particularly with respect to artistic creations, gives
rise to a greater entitlement or a stronger moral claim than other
property.67 Supremacy of the artist’s personhood is deemed
essential to incentivizing intellectual creativity, as well as to
justifying artist control, and economic incentives are
subordinated.68 Although one noted problem with the personality
justification is that there are some forms of intellectual property
which simply do not appear to manifest the personality of their
creators, musical performance, and particularly vocal
performance, does not present that problem.69
As referenced, supra, the Ninth Circuit—having
responsibility for one of the two heaviest dockets of music-related
cases of all federal appellate courts in the nation—explicitly
acknowledged that a “human voice is one of the most palpable
ways identity is manifested,” and on that basis a “singer
manifests herself in the song.”70 Accordingly, personhood theory
supports protection of vocalists’ personality interests arguably
more so than any other author, particularly given the instant
recognition and association of the vocalist’s voice with the
vocalist’s person.

66
Id. at 958, 960. Radin then developed an intuitive “personhood perspective” to
create objective criteria that could differentiate good identification with objects,
which is worthy of recognition, from bad identification or fetishism, which is not. Id.
at 968–69.
67
See, e.g., Corinna Coors, Morality, Utility, Reality? Justifying Celebrity Rights
in the 21st Century, 44 SYRACUSE J. INT’L. L. & COM. 215, 227 (2017) (discussing
personality theory as justification for right of publicity).
68
See id.
69
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 340
(1988) (discussing right of publicity and identifying musical works, along with
poems, stories, novels, sculpture, paintings, and prints as being among those works
that are “clearly receptacles for personality,” and identifying works that do not
appear to manifest personality).
70
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
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B. Moral Rights Defined
Moral rights are rights in creative works that belong
exclusively to the natural person who authors the work; they are
not available to corporate entities, and they are generally
inalienable.71 The moral rights doctrine, as originally developed
in France, includes four core moral rights.
The right of
disclosure gives a creative work author the sole right to
determine whether, when, and how the work will be made
available for public viewing.72 The corollary right of withdrawal
conditionally allows the artist to withdraw the work from public
display and dissemination. The right of attribution, or right of
paternity, assures that only the author will be identified as the
creator. And the right of integrity empowers the artist to
prohibit mutilation, material alteration, distortion, and
destruction of the work, as well as to prohibit use or display of
the work in a context or manner that is derogatory or otherwise
harmful to the author’s honor and reputation, or contrary to the
author’s intentions.73
Together these moral rights, which are generally inalienable,
provide the author of a creative work with a means to control
third party use and exploitation of a work, from creation to postrelease of the work for public consumption, throughout the
duration of the work’s existence, or, at least, for the author’s
lifetime.74 They also provide a means of maintaining and
controlling the author’s personal connection to the work, thereby
limiting the degree of alienation after physical embodiments of
the work are transferred to another, and even after certain
intangible rights in the work are transferred to another.75
C. Civil Law Nations vs. Common Law Nations and Monist vs.
Dualist Perspectives
Nations are said to differ in the nature and scope of legal
protections for creative works, depending, generally, upon
whether they are a civil law nation or a common law nation. The
71

See Petrik, supra note 19, at 366–67, 367 n.32.
See id. at 363.
73
See, e.g., Bird & Ponte, supra note 21, at 220–21; Cyrill P. Rigamonti,
Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 362–64 (2006) (discussing the
four rights in the context of Continental Europe); Lacey, supra note 5, at 1549
(discussing the four rights recognized under French doctrine).
74
See Rigamonti, supra note 73, at 355–56.
75
See Petrik, supra note 19, at 367.
72
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United States is known to adhere to the common law system of
copyright protection derived from the common law and copyright
statutes of the United Kingdom, while Continental Europe
adheres to a civil law system, which evolved primarily in France
and Germany.76 The systems diverge primarily with respect to
their view on the purpose of and philosophical basis for copyright
law, which then leads to divergent views on protection of
personhood interests and the related handling of moral rights
aimed at protecting those interests.77
Defining “the adoption of civil-law-style moral rights
legislation” as a “major shift in terms of copyright theory,”
Professor Cyrill Rigamonti explained the distinction between
civil law nations and common law nations as follows:
[I]t had been a canon of comparative copyright scholarship that
the most significant difference between Anglo-American and
Continental European copyright law was their respective
attitudes toward moral rights. The inclusion of moral rights in
statutory copyright law was generally understood to be the
defining feature of the Continental copyright tradition, while
the lack of statutory moral rights protection was considered to
be a crucial component of the Anglo-American copyright
tradition. This dichotomy had been celebrated and cultivated
since World War II on both sides of the Atlantic to the point
where the statutory protection of moral rights or the lack
thereof had become an integral part of each legal system’s
identity, essentially dividing the world of copyright into two
fundamentally different ideal types, one that includes moral
rights, and another that excludes moral rights. The common
law courts were fully aware of this dichotomy, and while they
recognized the existence of the concept of moral rights in civil
law countries, they uniformly rejected its applicability in their
own jurisdictions.78

76
See, e.g., Michael B. Gunlicks, A Balance of Interests: The Concordance of
Copyright Law and Moral Rights in the Worldwide Economy, 11 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 601, 602 (2001).
77
See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in
Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, passim (1990)
(demonstrating that prior to the French revolution, copyright law in France and the
United States was quite similar, and attributing the divergence in the regimes to
“development of personalist doctrines, such as moral rights, by French copyright
scholars and courts”).
78
Rigamonti, supra note 73, at 354 (footnotes omitted).
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Other scholars have distinguished the nations’ approaches—
categorizing them as monist or dualistic—based upon the
treatment of moral or personality rights and economic rights in
creative works, rather than based upon the total absence of
moral rights.79
The dualistic perspective, typically associated with civil law
nations, considers as distinct elements for protection the
property/economic rights and the moral/personal rights,80
employing, at times, copyright law to the former and neighboring
rights laws to the latter.81 French copyright law based on
author’s rights or the droit d’auteur, for example, is said to reflect
the civil law, dual nature approach. It specifies an “exclusive
incorporeal property right” in an author’s works, including
“attributes of an intellectual and moral nature,” which are
“perpetual, inalienable, and imprescriptible,” as well as
“attributes of an economic nature,” which are limited in duration
and assignable independent of the moral rights.82 Scholar Neil
Netanel cautions, however: “The dual character of French droits
d’auteur should not be overemphasized . . . French commentators
speak of the interdependence of the moral and economic rights,
and indeed, of the predominance of the former over the latter.”83
The monist legal perspective, typically associated with
common law nations, considers moral rights to be “rolled into the
general protections afforded a creator’s property or economic
rights under copyright,” instead of recognizing moral rights
separately.84 For example, German copyright law follows the
monist approach to droit d’auteur, pursuant to which “economic
and moral rights are considered thoroughly intertwined so that
both aspects of copyright cannot be dissociated from each
other.”85 Based upon that view, the German Copyright Act
permits transfer of copyright ownership by testamentary
disposition, but otherwise deems the copyright inalienable,

79

See Bird & Ponte, supra note 21, at 213–14.
See id.
81
See Netanel, supra note 54, at 22–23 (citing HENRI DESBOIS, LE DROIT
D’AUTEUR EN FRANCE 275 (3d ed. 1978)).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Bird & Ponte, supra note 21, at 214.
85
Reto M. Hilty & Alexander Peukert, “Equitable Remuneration” in Copyright
Law: The Amended German Copyright Act as a Trap for the Entertainment Industry
in the U.S.?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 401, 406–07 (2004).
80
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subject to licensing of the economic rights only.86 But these
exploitation rights still remain secondary, so-called “daughter”
rights, that are always bound to “mother” rights that stay with
the author.87 “All rights revert to the author upon termination of
an exploitation contract.”88
The United States adheres to a pseudo monist legal
perspective; “pseudo” because copyright protection in the United
States emphasizes economic rights, but rather than being “rolled
up” with the economic rights, moral rights are largely
disregarded.89
III. TREATY-RELATED U.S. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS TOUCHING
MORAL RIGHTS
The United States is a signatory to two major international
agreements—the
Berne
Convention
and
the
WIPO’s
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”)—which require
provision of the moral rights of integrity and attribution, in
accord with Continental influences. Yet, the United States has
continued its adherence to a copyright regime which ignores
moral rights for most authors of copyrightable works. The WPPT
specifically applies to music vocalists, among other performers.90
Although the Berne Convention does not apply to music

86

Id. at 407–08 (“[T]he author may grant an economic right to another to use
the work in a particular manner. An exploitation right may be granted as a nonexclusive or exclusive right and may be limited in respect to time, place or
purpose.”).
87
Id.
88
Id. at 408.
89
See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976)
(“American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or
provide a cause of action for their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the
economic, rather than the personal, rights of authors.”); Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164
F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947) (where artist contracted with publisher to produce art
work for use by publisher in its publication under terms of which artist completely
divested himself of title and ownership of pictures as well as rights to their
possession, control, and use, artist could not enjoin publisher from reproducing
pictures produced by him without his name appearing thereon and without credit to
him on ground that it violated his so-called “moral rights”).
90
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, art. 2(a), Dec. 20, 1996,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=295477 [hereinafter WPPT]
(“ ‘[P]erformers’ are actors, singers, musicians, dancers, and other persons who act,
sing, deliver, declaim, play in, interpret or otherwise perform literary or artistic
works or expressions of folklore.”).
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performers,91 a discussion of its implementation in the United
States is warranted due to the negative impact it has had on
music performers, notwithstanding its inapplicability.
A.

Pertinent Effects of the Berne Convention Implementation Act
of 1988

The Berne Convention was established as an international
agreement for the protection of the rights of authors in their
literary and artistic works.92
Article 6bis, first added by
amendment in 1928 and later broadened by amendment in
1972,93 mandates provision of a right of attribution and a right of
integrity for the life of the artist, at a minimum, but leaves to
each signatory the means of provision and enforcement.94
Exploring comparative historical compliance, and clarifying the
public international standard for compliance with Article 6bis,
Professor Justin Hughes noted that “[r]espectable adherence to
[Article 6bis] historically did not require express statutory
provisions establishing the two moral rights.”95 Moral rights
were not codified in France, the country of their origin, until
1957, long after the 1928 amendment adding Article 6bis, and
“most major common law countries—and several significant civil
91
Berne Convention, supra note 20, at art. 2(1) (excluding any mention of music
performance and sound recordings from the definition of the covered “literary and
artistic works”).
92
See id. at 4; Kwall, supra note 54, at 1954 n.38.
93
Bella Karakis, Moral Rights: French, United States and Soviet Compliance
with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, 5 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 105, 109–10 (1994).
94
Article 6bis provides as follows:
(1) Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work,
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding
paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of
the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions
authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of their
ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection
after the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding
paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his death,
cease to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article
shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is
claimed.
Berne Convention, supra note 20, at 7.
95
Hughes, supra note 21, at 706.
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law countries—were members of the Berne Convention for
decades before they passed moral rights statutes for the two
Article 6bis rights.”96 These countries relied on their existing
domestic laws, prior to finally codifying moral rights provisions.97
The United States became a signatory in 1988 and enacted
the Berne Convention Implementation Act (the “BCIA”), effective
March 1, 1989.98
The near-century-long delay in the United
States’ accession to the Berne Convention is partially attributed
to “debate over the requirements of Article 6bis,” “whether [it]
required the United States to enact new laws protecting moral
rights,” and a concern of “[c]ertain proprietary groups” that even
without new laws, “the very fact of adherence could work a
gradual but substantial change in the American copyright system
and the protections accorded authors.”99
Congress intentionally did not incorporate moral rights into
the Copyright Act or provide an express grant by any other
means after becoming a Berne signatory. In the course of
enacting the BCIA, Congress acknowledged that no federal
statute provided for moral rights and that “various decisions of
state and federal courts [had] rejected claims that were
denominated specifically as ‘moral rights’ or that sought relief
under the ‘moral rights’ doctrine.”100 Nonetheless, Congress
concluded that protection of the moral rights mandated by Article
6bis was provided under then existing law, including “various
provisions of the Copyright Act and Lanham Act, various state
96

Id.
Professor Hughes explained that the United Kingdom, a civil nation, had
“concluded that moral rights as such were unknown in English jurisprudence and a
matter best left to ‘contract between the parties concerned,’ ” before codifying “a
small piece of a modern statutory moral-rights system” in its 1956 copyright law
revision to narrowly address false attribution; and, it was not until 1988 that the
United Kingdom passed legislation covering both Article 6bis rights, relying until
then on “a composite of contract law and common law” torts such as “defamation,
injurious falsehood, passing-off, and privacy violations.” Id. at 707. New Zealand
adopted the U.K. moral rights statute in 1994, while Australia did not codify moral
rights provisions until 2000. Id. at 708. Similarly, Switzerland relied on its Civil
Code protections of “an individual’s right of personality, including honor, reputation,
and privacy,” from 1887 to 1992, when it finally codified provisions recognizing
Article 6bis rights. Id. at 708–09.
98
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853; H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917
[hereinafter “BCIA”].
99
H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6917
(legislative history for Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), background).
100
S. Res. No. 100-352, at 9–10 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706,
3714–15.
97
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statutes, and common law principles such as libel, defamation,
misrepresentation, and unfair competition, which have been
applied by courts to redress authors’ invocation of the right to
claim authorship or the right to object to distortion.”101 As
Professor Hughes points outs, “[t]his patchwork protection was
not an ingenious, last minute creation of Capitol Hill staff in
1988; it had a long conceptual and practical history,” appearing
in legal literature as early as 1940, and subsequently in a 1959
“detailed study on the issue . . . as part of the long review of
[U.S.] copyright law that contributed to the 1976 Act.”102
The BCIA cemented the intended omission of new moral
rights law by expressly providing that: (i) the Berne Convention
provisions are “not self-executing under the Constitution and
laws of the United States,” (ii) United States obligations
thereunder “may be performed only pursuant to appropriate
domestic law,” and (iii) “no further rights or interests shall be
recognized or created for that purpose.”103 The BCIA expressly
negated any right to file a lawsuit to directly enforce the
provisions of the Berne Convention and it expressly denied any
change, whether under federal, state, or common law, to an
author’s right to claim authorship of a work or to “object to any
distortion, mutilation, or other medication of, or other derogatory
action in relation to the work, that would prejudice the author’s
honor or reputation.”104
Although the United States was not alone in its reliance on
non-copyright domestic laws to support its adherence to Article
6bis,105 the BCIA did not simply leave United States authors on
the same footing they were on prior to its enactment. Sections 1
and 2 of the BCIA confirmed the preeminence of domestic law,
but also established rules of construction which effectively
directed courts not to consider Article 6bis adherence obligations
in the course of applying the domestic law relied upon to satisfy
those obligations.
The BCIA provided for numerous significant amendments to
the Copyright Act, which took effect in March 1989, although
none extended the right of attribution or right of integrity to all

101
102
103
104
105

Id.
Hughes, supra note, 21, at 666 & nn.34–35.
BCIA, supra note, 98, § 2.
Id. § 3.
Hughes, supra note 21, at 707–09.
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authors, as is mandatory under the Berne Convention.106 Two
amendments are of specific import here. Section 104 of the
Copyright Act, regarding “[s]ubject matter of copyright,” was
amended to add subpart (c):
(c) EFFECT OF BERNE CONVENTION. — No right or interest
in a work eligible for protection under this title may be claimed
by virtue of, or in reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne
Convention, or the adherence of the United States thereto. Any
rights in a work eligible for protection under this title that
derive from this title, other Federal or State statutes, or the
common law, shall not be expanded or reduced by virtue of, or in
reliance upon, the provisions of the Berne Convention, or the
adherence of the United States thereto.107

Section 301 of the Act, regarding “[p]reemption with respect to
other laws”108 was amended to add subpart (e) as follows: “(e)
The scope of Federal preemption under this section is not
affected by the adherence of the United States to the Berne
Convention or the satisfaction of obligations of the United States
thereunder.”109
These two BCIA amendments to the Copyright Act, together
with the subsequent enactment of VARA110, have worked to
thwart numerous attempts by U.S. authors to use existing
federal or state statutory law, as well as common law, to enforce
the spirit of the rights of attribution and integrity the United
States is obligated to provide under the Berne Convention.
Consequently, as will be demonstrated infra, U.S. music authors
were put in a worse position with respect to moral rights than
they were in prior to the BCIA.

106

BCIA, supra note 98.
Id. § 4; see also 17 U.S.C. § 104(c) (2002).
108
See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1998) (“On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified by § 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by §§ 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether
published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the
common law or statutes of any State.”).
109
BCIA, supra note 98, § 6 (“Preemption With Respect To Other Laws Not
Affected”).
110
VARA has been criticized as noncompliant with Article 6bis. See, e.g.,
Hughes, supra note 21, at 671–74.
107
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B. WIPO’s Performances and Phonograms Treaty
The WPPT was adopted in 1996, to provide new “protection
for performers of audio works and producers of phonograms (i.e.,
sound recordings).”111 The United States, an original signatory,
enacted the WIPO Copyright and Performers and Phonograms
Treaty Implementation Act of 1997 (“WCPPTIA”), effective in full
as of May 20, 2002.112
As mentioned above, the WPPT includes music vocalists in
the definition of performers, while it defines a “producer of a
phonogram” to mean the person or entity that “takes the
initiative and has the responsibility for the first fixation of the
sounds of a performance.”113 Parallel to Article 6bis with respect
to Berne Convention authors, WPPT Article 5(1) mandates
provision of a right of attribution and a right of integrity for the
life of the performer, at a minimum, but leaves to each signatory
the means of provision and enforcement as follows:
(1) Independently of a performer’s economic rights, and even
after the transfer of those rights, the performer shall, as regards
his live aural performances or performances fixed in
phonograms, have the right to claim to be identified as the
performer of his performances, except where omission is
dictated by the manner of the use of the performance, and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of his
performance which would be prejudicial to his reputation.
(2) The rights granted to a performer in accordance with the
paragraph (1) shall, after his death, be maintained, at least
until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable
by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of
the [signatory] where protection is claimed. However, those
[signatories] whose legislation, at the moment of their
111

S. Exec. Doc. No. 105-25, WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), at 1–2 (Oct. 14, 1998) [hereinafter
WCT & WPPT Exec. Rept.]. Notably, because the United States protects sound
recordings under copyright law, it initially pushed for updated protections for sound
recordings as part of the Berne Protocol process to update the Berne Convention;
however, “[t]he European Union and many other countries strenuously resisted
inclusion of sound recording protection because sound recordings are not copyright
subject matter under their laws nor, they insisted, under the Berne Convention.” Id.
at 2. “These countries were unwilling to change their theoretical basis for protecting
sound recordings or agree to an optional interpretation that sound recordings are
copyright subject matter under the Berne Convention.” Id. at 3.
112
See WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaty
Implementation Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-1. S. 1121 (Jul. 3, 1997). WPPT, supra
note 90, at 12.
113
WPPT, supra note 90, at art. 2(d) (emphasis added).
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ratification of or accession to this Treaty, does not provide for
the protection after the death of the performer of all the rights
set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of
these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by
this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the
[signatory] where protection is claimed.114

In addition to the mandated moral rights—which are not
granted to producers irrespective of whether the producer is a
person or an entity—the WPPT mandates that performers have
the exclusive economic right of authorizing the fixation and
public broadcast of their unfixed performances.115 As a result of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, U.S. performers have had
these additional exclusive rights regarding unfixed performances
since 1994 via § 1101 of the Copyright Act, which prohibits
unauthorized fixation and trafficking in sound recordings and
music videos subject to the same remedies provided for copyright
infringement.116
Otherwise, the rights of performers and producers under the
WPPT include: a common right to compensation for public
performance of sound recordings, subject to limited or complete
reservation,117 and parallel exclusive rights of reproduction,
distribution, commercial rental, and the making available by
wire or wireless means for interactive, digital on-demand public
access, with the distinction being that performers’ exclusive
rights are in their performances, while producers’ exclusive
rights are in their sound recordings.118 The Committee on
Foreign Relations explained:
These above-mentioned [parallel] rights may be exercised
separately by the performers and producers. Permission from both
the performer and the producer must be obtained for a third-party to

114

Id. at art. 5 (“Moral Rights of Performers”).
Id. at art. 6 (“Economic Rights of Performers in their Unfixed
Performances”).
116
17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 1101 (2012); see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act
adding chapter 11, entitled “Sound Recordings and Music Videos,” to title 17. Pub. L.
No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4974.
117
WPPT, supra note 90, at art. 15 (“Right to Remuneration for Broadcasting
and Communication to the Public”).
118
Compare id. at art. 7–10, with id. at art. 11–14 (rights of reproduction,
distribution, rental, and making available fixed performances (for performers) and
sound recordings (for producers)).
115
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reproduce, distribute, rent, or make available a phonogram (subject
of course to any limitations on these rights legislated pursuant to
Article 16),119

which makes all rights under the WPPT (including the moral
rights) subject to fair use under § 107 of the Copyright Act, as
well as all other limitations and restrictions provided for in
§§ 108–122.120
All except the moral rights apply retroactively to any works
that were not in the public domain as of the date of entry into
force.121 The expanded digital performance right added in 1998
by the DMCA appears to satisfy the common right to
remuneration for public performance, subject to a reservation
that the right only applies to digital performances. At first
glance, it also appears to satisfy the parallel exclusive “making
available . . .” rights, except that the digital performance right
under § 106 belongs only to the owner of the sound recording
copyright, and thus likely excludes the performer’s separate
exclusive right from the very start, as a matter of music industry
practice whereby that copyright is rather automatically
transferred to the record label.122 The same issue exists for the
parallel exclusive rights of reproduction, distribution, and rental
of the performer’s “performance[] fixed in phonogram” and the
producer’s phonograms.123 Even if performers were deemed joint
authors of a sound recording and thus joint copyright owners
along with the record label as the producer, only one
author/owner’s permission would be required for a third party to
reproduce or distribute the sound recording.124
Thus, the
intended co-existing mutually exclusive rights in the fixed

119

WCT & WPPT Exec. Rept., supra note 111, at 9 (emphasis added).
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–122 (providing various limitations on exclusive rights);
see also WPPT, supra note 90, at art. 16.
121
WPPT, supra note 90, at art. 22; Berne Convention, supra note 20, at art. 18;
see also WCT & WPPT Exec. Rept., supra note 111, at 13–14.
122
17 U.S.C. § 106(6); see also John P. Strohm, Writings in the Margin (Of
Error): The Authorship of Sound Recordings under United States Copyright Law, 34
CUMB. L. REV. 127, 130 (2003).
123
Summary of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) (1996),
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/
wppt/summary_wppt.html (last visited September 21, 2018 2:45 PM).
124
17 U.S.C. § 201(a); see also Benjamin E. Jaffe, Rebutting the Equality
Principle: Adapting the Co-Tenancy Law Model to Enhance the Remedies Available
to Joint Copyright Owners, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1549, 1555 (2011).
120
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performance for the performer and in the sound recording for the
producer are conflated with exclusive rights in the sound
recording under U.S. copyright law.
Nothing was done to remedy the conflation. The substantive
amendments to the Copyright Act contained in the WCT &
WPPT Implementation Act focused almost entirely on what was
necessary to implement the WIPO Copyright Treaty.125 There
were no amendments adding new rights for music performers. In
particular, § 106 was not amended to reflect the exclusive rights
of performers in their fixed performances, nor was § 102
amended to reflect statutory recognition of music performance as
a copyrightable work, once fixed. Reminiscent of the legislature’s
stance regarding Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, the stated
presumption of the Committee on Foreign Relations regarding
WPPT was that:
The United States presumably will continue to rely upon
copyright law as the primary vehicle for sound recording
protection, supplemented by criminal penalties for knowing
infringements for purposes of commercial gain. In addition to
federal law, the United States may rely in part on state
statutory and common law to satisfy some treaty obligations.126

Consequently, there exists a gap in the WPPT protections
the United States is obligated to provide with respect to the
moral rights of attribution and integrity for music performers, as
well as the exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution for
music performers in their fixed performances.
IV. THE INCREASING INEFFICACY OF ALTERNATIVE LEGAL
THEORIES IN LIEU OF MORAL RIGHTS
Upon considering claims sounding in moral rights, courts
have consistently held that there is no recognition of moral rights
within the United States, even in instances where the court went
on to grant some relief.127 Courts have also consistently rejected
125
See WCT & WPPT Implementation Act, ch. 12, Public Law 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (1998) (amending the Copyright Act by adding § 1201 (circumvention of
copyright protection systems), § 1202 (integrity of copyright management
information), § 1203 (civil remedies), and § 1204 (criminal offenses and penalties)).
126
WCT & WPPT Exec. Rept., supra note 111, at 8.
127
See, e.g., Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1392 n.10 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[U]nder
copyright law, while a licensor has no ‘moral right’ to control the quality of licensed
depictions she may insist, contractually, on approval provisions to ‘assure quality
control and high standards in the exploitation’ of her creative work.”) (internal
citations omitted); Gilliam v. ABC, 538. F.2d 14, 23–24 (2d Cir. 1976) (granting relief
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claimed trademark rights in “signature songs” as a basis for
trademark infringement claims brought against third parties
using the songs without the music vocalist’s permission.128
Otherwise, in the realm of redress sought for harms to
personhood there has been little consistency from case to case.
Whether an author has obtained relief under an alternative
theory has depended upon the luck of the draw regarding who,
what, where, when, and how. Who were the parties? What
theory could be made to fit the harm? Where was the venue or
court of jurisdiction? When was the claim brought, pre- or postBCIA? How bad was the alleged wrongful conduct?
As the Second Circuit has made plain: “American courts
have in varying degrees acknowledged the idea of moral rights,
cloaking the concept in the guise of other legal theories, such as
copyright, unfair competition, invasion of privacy, defamation,
and breach of contract.”129 In her 1985 article exploring the
interplay between the then-recently enacted 1976 Act and the
moral rights doctrine, Professor Roberta Kwall observed that:
The overwhelming number of commentators who have studied
this question have concluded that the scope of protection in
America for the personal rights of creators is insufficient. The
criticism is not surprising given that patchwork measures
rarely approximate the degree of protection afforded by a
cohesive legal theory whose exclusive objective is the specific
protection of precise interests.
Although the substitute theories [mainly “unfair competition,
breach of contract, defamation, and invasion of privacy”] afford
creators varying levels of protection for their moral rights,
American creators typically are at a relative disadvantage
compared to creators in moral right countries. The major
difficulty facing American creators is the additional burden of
molding moral rights claims into other recognized causes of
action. Given that all of the substitute theories are supported by
a theoretical basis different from that of the moral right doctrine,
a successful claim may require elements of proof which are not
applicable directly to a moral rights claim. The moral right
doctrine is concerned with the creator’s personality rights and
society’s interest in preserving the integrity of its culture. These
via contract law, copyright law, and unfair competition law); Franconero v.
Universal Music Corp., No. 02 Civ.1963(RO), 2003 WL 22990060 at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 19, 2003) (denying relief).
128
See infra Part IV.b.3.
129
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995).
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interests are not the exclusive, or even the primary, focus of any
of the substitute theories, all of which developed in response to
completely different social concerns.130

Still, the odds for a favorable outcome were better prior to the
BCIA.
A.

Unfair Competition

Use of a music composition in a radio or television
commercial requires license from the music composition
copyright owner, and use of the performance master as well
requires an additional license from the sound recording copyright
owner. If the music vocalist owns neither copyright—which is
more often the case than not—then copyright law does not
require the vocalist’s permission at all. For playing of a sound
recording in a public arena, like at a political campaign rally,
permission is not required from even a vocalist with ownership of
the sound recording copyright, because sound recordings have no
public performance rights as part of their copyright bundle, aside
from the digital right.131
Consequently, for decades music vocalists have turned to
unfair competition, seeking relief from unwanted associations
with politicians and commercial products and services and other
objectionable uses of their songs. The degree of success in
asserting unfair competition claims has depended, primarily, on
whether the claim was one for false designation or trademark
infringement or false endorsement, the timing of the claim, and
whether the claim was based on use of the vocalist’s actual
recorded performance.
1.

False Designation of Origin in Lieu of the Rights of
Attribution and Integrity

Pre-BCIA, the outcomes were particularly favorable for
claims that could be aligned with the theory of false designation
of origin under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.132 Post-BCIA, such
130

Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra note 21, at 17–18, 23–24
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
131
See Patrick Koncel, Did Copyright Kill the Radio Star? Why the Recorded
Music Industry and Copyright Act Should Welcome Webcasters into the Fold, 14. J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 292, 297–302 (2015); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106(6)
(2012); id. § 114(a).
132
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (creating liability for “[a]ny person
who . . . uses in commerce . . . any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—(A) is likely
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claims have failed as a substitute for the moral rights required
under both the Berne Convention and the WPPT, for reasons
attributable to copyright preemption.133
a.

Pre-BCIA Reliability

Two successful false designation cases out of the Ninth
Circuit, Smith v. Montoro134 in 1981 and Lamothe v. Atlantic
Recording Corp.135 in 1988, concerned the right of attribution for
an actor on motion picture credits and for two of three joint
authors on music compositions, respectively. The Ninth Circuit
held that relief for misattribution was available under the false
designation theory of “reverse passing off,” if the rightful name
was replaced with another or if some, but not all, of the rightful
names were omitted.136
An earlier successful case out of the Second Circuit in 1976,
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Company, Inc.,137 concerned
the right of integrity; the plaintiffs prevailed on a combination of
copyright infringement and contract theory, as well as on a
theory of mutilation of an original work in violation of Lanham
Act § 43(a).138 The British group of writers and performers
known as Monty Python won an injunction to stop television
network ABC from broadcasting edited versions of three
originally ninety-minute television episodes from which a total of
twenty-four minutes had been excised to accommodate
commercial breaks and omit material deemed too offensive or
obscene.139 As to the claim seeking redress for “actionable
mutilation” and “deformation of an artist’s work,” for example,
the claim sounding in right of integrity violation, the court found
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection,
or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another
person . . . .”).
133
Accord Rigamonti, supra note 73, at 355 (arguing in 2006, that “if the goal
was to increase the overall protection of authors, it was a step in the wrong direction
for the common law countries to adopt the civil law concept of moral rights, because
the statutory moral rights regimes that were enacted in the United States and the
United Kingdom have likely reduced rather than increased the aggregate level of
authorial protection”).
134
648 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1981).
135
847 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1988). In Lamothe, the court also held that the
licensee defendants were liable for the incomplete designations. Id. at 1408.
136
Id. at 1406–08; Smith, 648 F.2d at 607.
137
538 F.2d 14, 25 (2d Cir. 1976).
138
Id. at 23–25.
139
Id. at 18, 26.
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a violation of the Lanham Act prohibition against false
designation, holding that ABC’s broadcast of the edited versions
“impaired the integrity of the . . . work and represented to the
public as the product of [the plaintiffs’] what was actually a mere
caricature of their talents.”140 In so holding, the Second Circuit
explained its rationale as follows:
American copyright law, as presently written, does not
recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for their
violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather
than the personal, rights of authors. Nevertheless, the economic
incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that serves as the
foundation for American copyright law, [citations-1], cannot be
reconciled with the inability of artists to obtain relief for
mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to the public on
which the artists are financially dependent. Thus courts have
long granted relief for misrepresentation of an artist’s work by
relying on theories outside the statutory law of copyright, such
as contract law, [citations-2], or the tort of unfair competition
[citations-3]. Although such decisions are clothed in terms of
proprietary right in one’s creation, they also properly vindicate
the author’s personal right to prevent the presentation of his
work to the public in a distorted form. [citations-4]141

Pre-BCIA, all three of the above-referenced false designation
cases under Lanham Act § 43(a) were oft-cited decisions and
reliable precedent for similar sounding claims. But the home
that some would-be moral rights claims had found in the federal
statutory prohibition against false designation of origin was
obliterated, after a case involving the alleged reverse passing off
of a documentary films series—Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp.142—reached the Supreme Court.
140

Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 24 (emphasis added). Omitted citations are, respectively: (1) Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 93 S.Ct. 2303, 37 L.Ed.2d 163 (1973); Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 74 S.Ct. 460, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954); (2) Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d
Cir. 1952) (substantial cutting of original work constitutes misrepresentation);
(3) Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass.1939), and
Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author 128-138, in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT (1963);
and (4) Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F.2d 891, 895-96 (2d Cir. 1937);
Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 554, 568 (1940). But see
Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 27 (Gurfein, J., concurring) (“So far as the Lanham Act is
concerned, it is not a substitute for droit moral which authors in Europe enjoy. If
the licensee may, by contract, distort the recorded work, the Lanham Act does not
come into play. If the licensee has no such right by contract, there will be a violation
in breach of contract.”).
142
539 U.S. 23, 27 (2003).
141
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Post-BCIA Claim Failures in the Wake of Dastar

Notably, Dastar was not a case seeking redress for a wouldbe moral rights violation. Because the copyright for the film
series had lapsed thereby casting the series into the public
domain, Fox sought relief on a Lanham Act passing off claim
instead of asserting copyright infringement, when Dastar slightly
modified the series, repackaged it, and then sold it under a
different name without attribution to Fox’s original series.143
The Dastar Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit’s
affirmation of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and
held that the term “origin of goods” in § 43(a) of the Lanham Act
“refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for
sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or
communication embodied in these goods.”144
The Court’s
rationale was that interpreting § 43(a) otherwise created a
conflict with copyright law, which allows copying of works in the
public domain freely and without attribution.145 That rationale
was certainly consistent with the Supreme Court’s prior firm
stance against allowing the “misuse or over-extension” of
Lanham Act claims to circumvent limitations on the scope and
duration of monopolies afforded under copyright and patent
law.146 In other words, the Dastar Court was concerned with
conflict preemption.
The Dastar opinion cited Smith v. Montoro, among other
federal circuit cases, for the proposition that “every Circuit to
consider the issue found § 43(a) broad enough to encompass
reverse passing off,”147 without expressly overruling Smith v.
Montoro or Lamothe, and their progeny. It made no mention of
Gilliam’s application of Lanham Act § 43 to provide relief for the
143

Id. at 26–27.
Id. at 37.
145
Id.
146
The Dastar Court reasoned: “Assuming for the sake of argument that
Dastar’s representation of itself as the ‘Producer’ of its videos amounted to a
representation that it originated the creative work conveyed by the videos, allowing
a cause of action under § 43(a) for that representation would create a species of
mutant copyright law that limits the public’s ‘federal right to “copy and to use” ’
expired copyrights.” Id. at 34 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165 (1989)); see also id. at 34, 36–37 (citing TrafFix Devices, Inc.
v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 230 (1964); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121–22
(1938); In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)).
147
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 30.
144
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would-be right of integrity violation under reverse passing off
false designation of origin. Yet, Dastar’s holding that “the phrase
‘origin of goods’ is . . . incapable of connoting the person or entity
that originated the ideas or communications that ‘goods’ embody
or contain”148 effectively eliminated the claim as a basis for relief
concerning creative expressions and copyrighted works. Most
unfortunately, its application has not been limited to cases
involving works in the public domain.149 Instead, courts have
relied upon Dastar to deny false designation/right of attribution
claims brought by various plaintiffs, in and outside of the music
industry.150
Consistent with the express instruction in § 2 and § 4 of the
BCIA, the Dastar Court made no mention of Article 6bis and
gave no apparent consideration to the need to preserve Lanham
Act claims as an available domestic law path to enforcement of
the right of attribution.151 But the Dastar Court had indeed
considered and interpreted Congress’ intentional omission of
moral rights for all but the subset of authors identified in VARA:
When Congress has wished to create such an addition to the law
of copyright, it has done so with much more specificity than the
Lanham Act’s ambiguous use of “origin.” The Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990, [ ] provides that the author of an artistic
work “shall have the right . . . to claim authorship of that work.”
17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A). That express right of attribution is
carefully limited and focused: It attaches only to specified
“work[s] of visual art,” § 101, is personal to the artist,
§§ 106A(b) and (e), and endures only for “the life of the author,”
§ 106A(d)(1). Recognizing in § 43(a) a cause of action for
148

Id. at 32.
Indeed, most of the cases citing Dastar involve Lanham Act claims in
connection with third party uses of works that are still copyright protected. See, e.g.,
Tom W. Bell, Misunderestimating Dastar: How the Supreme Court Unwittingly
Revolutionized Copyright Preemption, 65 MD. L. REV. 206, 214–15 (2006) (discussing
how lower courts have applied Dastar).
150
See, e.g., Zyla v. Wadsworth, Div. of Thomson Corp., 360 F.3d 243, 252 (1st
Cir. 2004) (applying Dastar to support preemption of Lanham Act claim regarding
credit for a copyrighted textbook); Borrego v. BMG U.S. Latin, 92 F. App’x 572, 572
(9th Cir. 2004) (affirming summary judgment dismissing music composition author’s
claim rising from mistaken attribution to another songwriter and holding that under
Dastar, “Borrego no longer has a claim for ‘reverse passing off’ ”); Santa Rosa v.
Combo Records, 376 F. Supp. 2d 148, 151–52 (D. P.R. 2005) (citing Dastar to dismiss
false designation of origin claim based upon record company’s omission of salsa
singer’s name from joint recordings); Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F.
Supp. 2d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Carroll v. Kahn, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1357, 1361–62
(N.D.N.Y. 2003).
151
See, e.g., Dastar, 539 U.S. at 23.
149
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misrepresentation of authorship of noncopyrighted works
(visual or otherwise) would render these limitations
superfluous. A statutory interpretation that renders another
statute superfluous is of course to be avoided.152

Thus, Dastar is read to support preemption of the Lanham Act
§ 43(a) claim as a means of vindicating moral rights. Though
widely criticized for reaching beyond the scope of the issues
presented in the case itself,153 Dastar remains the law of the land.
Examining the legislative histories of the BCIA, VARA, and
the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 (“TLRA”), Professor
Mary LaFrance criticized Dastar two years after the opinion,
rightly concluding that its narrow construction of § 43(a) is
contrary to Congress’ express approval of Gilliam and Smith v.
Montoro, as is reflected in the legislative history of the BCIA,
without contradiction in that of the TLRA:
The near-simultaneous consideration and enactment of these
statutes makes the BCIA’s legislative history particularly
helpful in interpreting the TLRA. Unfortunately, the Dastar
opinion overlooks evidence in the BCIA’s history which strongly
suggests that the 100th Congress not only acquiesced in the
application of section 43(a) to false attributions of works of
authorship, but expressly endorsed that application as an
important component of the network of state and federal laws
upon which Congress relied in concluding that the United
States could comply with the moral rights provisions of the
Berne Convention without enacting any new moral rights
legislation. In contrast to the legislative history of the TLRA,
which is highly ambiguous in its treatment of reverse passing
off claims in general, the legislative history of the BCIA strongly
suggests that the 1988 Congress approved of applying section
43(a) to reverse passing off of literary and artistic works.
The Final Report of Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence
to the Berne Convention, issued in 1986, cited the then-current
version of section 43(a) as a proxy for the moral rights of
attribution and integrity. With respect to attribution, the
Report unequivocally states that section 43(a) (as in effect at
that time) “prohibits false designations of origins of works,
including intellectual and artistic works, and prohibits false

152

Id. at 34–35 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 21, at 696–703 (proposing “a number of
options . . . that could have avoided the uncertainties embedded in the opinion”);
Bell, supra note 149, at 224 & n.114 (citing law review articles with critical
commentary on Dastar); Rigamonti, supra note 73, at 409–10.
153
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descriptions and representations of such works.” Citing Smith
v. Montoro and work of the late Professor Melville Nimmer, the
Report notes “that omission of an author’s name from his work
may constitute ‘an implied reverse passing off’ and thus violate
section 43(a).” When publication without attribution misleads
the public into thinking that the publisher or producer of a
work, rather than its author, was the originator of the work, the
Report states, “[t]his is a false designation of origin under
section 43(a).” With respect to reverse passing off, the Report
notes, in a section captioned “Prohibiting Identification of
Another as Creator of the Author’s Work” that “[f]alse
identification of another as author . . . may give rise to a claim
by the actual author under section 43(a).”
In a section
captioned “Prohibiting Identification of the Author as Creator of
Another’s Work” - a reference to traditional passing off - the
Report recognizes a series of federal cases as precedents
supporting a remedy for “false identification” of expressive
works under section 43(a). Finally, with respect to the right of
integrity, the Final Report cites Gilliam as a leading case,
noting that “[c]ourts increasingly have granted authors
protection for the integrity of their work under section 43(a).”154

Despite the clear negative impact, Congress has done nothing to
counter Dastar’s obliteration of false designation of origin claims
as a viable legal theory for redress of would-be moral rights
violations. That is so, even in the face of the widespread judicial
applications of the Supreme Court’s opinion that VARA signals
legislative intent to preclude all authors from obtaining relief for
violations of rights granted under VARA—that is the limited
right of attribution and right of integrity—except for the limited
subset of visual artists to which § 106A of the Copyright Act
applies.
2.

False Endorsement Redress for Sound-Alikes, but not Actual
Performances

Various federal courts have found viable claims under
Lanham Act § 43(a) for false endorsement based upon use of a
celebrity’s name, image, or likeness to invoke their celebrity for
commercial purposes, where such use was likely to confuse the
consuming public about the celebrity’s association with or

154
Mary LaFrance, When You Wish Upon Dastar: Creative Provenance and the
Lanham Act, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 197, 222–24 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
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endorsement of the advertised goods or services.155 This theory of
recovery has been extended to sound-alikes, under state law as
well, establishing precedent that remains good law today.156
But, bizarrely, claims for false endorsement have failed most
music vocalists seeking to assert the theory for relief from use of
their actual recorded performances.
The failures can be
attributed to copyright preemption.157 There are, however,
additional challenges to the viability of a false endorsement claim
as an alternative to an express grant of moral rights. One is the
lack of a uniform test amongst federal circuits, which subjects
plaintiffs to forum dependent outcomes and possibly emboldens
defendants in venues with stricter tests.158 Another is the
unpredictability of First Amendment defenses that may apply to
the claim.159
Recording artist Tom Waits prevailed on his claim for false
endorsement—Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. in 1992—where Frito-Lay
used a sound-alike to mimic Waits’ sound and style of singing a
lyrically altered version of “Step Right Up,” a Waits song

155
See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 925–26 (6th Cir.
2003); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445 (6th Cir. 2003); Wendt v. Host
Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 813–14 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing dismissal of Lanham Act
claim for unfair competition and holding that the physical characteristics of robots
could give rise to a claim for false endorsement due to the likelihood of confusion
that the plaintiffs were endorsing the Cheers bars); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am.,
Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400–01 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding there was a genuine issue of
material fact precluding summary judgment as to a false implied endorsement claim
brought by Vanna White, the hostess of the “Wheel of Fortune” game show, for use
in an advertisement for VCRs of a look-alike caricature robot endorsing the
defendant’s product); Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 628–30 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (upholding actor Woody Allen’s claim of false implied endorsement for use in
an advertisement for video-rental stores of a look-alike renting videos from
defendant).
156
See, e.g., Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1021 (3d Cir. 2008);
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding a viable claim
under California common law).
157
See, e.g., Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d 424, 448
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (first citing Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2001);
then citing Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34
(2003)).
158
Id. at 448 (“Courts ‘have not established a uniform test for false endorsement
under the Lanham Act.’ ” (quoting Barbara A. Solomon, Can the Lanham Act Protect
Tiger Woods? An Analysis of Whether the Lanham Act is a Proper Substitute for a
Federal Right of Publicity, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1202, 1214 (2004))).
159
Id. at 447–48 (“[C]ourts must construe the Lanham Act narrowly where
necessary to avoid conflict with the First Amendment right to artistic expression.”
(citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989))).
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intended as “an indictment of advertising.”160 Waits took offense
because the commercial not only caused confusion, but also
conflicted with his long-standing and publicly asserted policy
against commercially-purposed endorsements, based on “his
philosophy that musical artists should not do commercials
because it detracts from their artistic integrity.”161 Certainly this
is the sort of ideological conflicting association that should be
protected against.
Nevertheless, myopically, most courts applying the Waits
precedent have focused on the distinctiveness of Waits’ voice
and/or whether the mimicked performance was close enough to
the original artist’s performance to cause the confusion required
for false endorsement. In one such instance—Henley v. DeVore—
a California federal district court concluded that a state
politician’s revision and performance of two Don Henley’s songs,
including “All She Wants to Do Is Dance,” was not likely to make
consumers believe Henley was singing the song.162 Dismissing
Henley’s false endorsement claim on that basis, and disregarding
survey evidence that forty-eight percent of consumers surveyed
believed that Henley—as the composition copyright owner—had
endorsed, authorized, or approved the politician’s use of the
songs, the court held that the relevant question under Waits was
“whether people would reasonably think that Henley actually
performed the music.”163 This outcome was an unfortunate
disregard of the false approval basis for a Lanham Act § 43(a)
claim, and it illustrates the inherent hit-or-miss nature of the
alternative theory approach to meeting the United States’ moral
rights obligations under the WPPT, as well as under the Berne
Convention.
One California federal district court did acknowledge that
confusion as to endorsement could exist even in the absence of
confusion as to source, when it refused to dismiss singersongwriter Jackson Browne’s claim against John McCain.
McCain had used Browne’s 1977 hit “Running On Empty” in
160

978 F.2d 1093, 1097 & n.1, 1111 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming judgment for
plaintiff, Tom Waits, on false implied endorsement claim for use in a snack-food
commercial of a singer who imitated plaintiff’s gravelly singing style praising
defendant’s product), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).
161
Id. at 1097.
162
733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1147, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Waits, 978 F.2d at
1111).
163
Id. at 1168–69 (emphasis in original).
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McCain’s 2008 presidential campaign web-video commercial to
criticize then Democratic Presidential candidate Barak Obama’s
energy policy.164 Plainly stating that the problem was an
ideology conflict, rather than an issue of money, Browne had
complained that he had “received numerous inquiries expressing
concern about Defendants’ use of the composition and Browne’s
performance,” and that “ ‘nothing could be further from the
truth’ ” than the commercial’s false suggestion that he sponsored,
endorsed, or was associated with McCain or the Republican
Party.165
But most courts have declined to extend the protection
afforded to Waits under Lanham Act § 43(a) from use of a soundalike singing a signature song, to music vocalists asserting the
same false endorsement claim based upon use of their actual
recorded performances.166
When Frito-Lay struck again, this time using singer Atrud
Gilberto’s 1964167 recorded performance of her world-famous
signature song, “The Girl from Ipanema,” as the soundtrack for a
thirty-second commercial introducing Frito-Lay’s baked potato
chips in 1996, the Second Circuit—in its 2001 Oliveira v. FritoLay, Inc. decision—summarily affirmed dismissal of Gilberto’s
false endorsement claim, holding simply that “use of her recorded
song ha[d] not taken her persona,” so “a factfinder could not
reasonably find an implied endorsement.”168
Following Oliveira, courts have held that a false
endorsement claim cannot be sustained purely on the basis of the
use of an artist’s song(s) and that use of a single signature song is
not enough.169 The apparent assumption is that consumers will
164

Browne v. McCain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1128, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
Defendant raised fair use as a defense, but the court declined to adjudicate the issue
on a motion to dismiss, as it was a mixed question of law and fact. Id. at 1130. The
court similarly rejected the defendant’s First Amendment artistic relevance defense,
due to its limited inquiry on the motion. Id. at 1132–33. The case settled prior to
adjudication on the merits. See Johnston, supra note 10, at 690.
165
Browne, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (quoting Complaint at 1, Browne v. McCain,
612 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CV 08-05334), 2008 WL 3849451).
166
Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 58, 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2001); Henley, 733
F. Supp. 2d at 1168; see also Arlen W. Langvardt, Musicians, Politicians and the
Forgotten Tort, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429, 476–78 (2017).
167
The pre-1972 sound recording of “The Girl from Ipanema” was subject to
state copyright law. See Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 64 n.2.
168
Id. at 58, 60, 62, 64.
169
See Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d 424, 453 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (holding “a single signature song, considered alone, cannot form the basis of a
false endorsement claim”; but finding sufficient evidence to support jury verdict of
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not be confused about endorsement if they hear the original
sound recording.170 Such an assumption implies that courts are
relying on consumers to know and understand that copyright
licensing practices enable use of sound recordings without the
music vocalist’s consent, and therefore the use does not support a
reasonable inference of endorsement.
Based on that judicial assumption, were Frito-Lay to make
another commercial using Waits’ actual recorded performance in
“Step Right Up” instead of a sound-alike, Waits would lose on his
claim. That result is absurd in the context of providing redress
for the ideological conflict that arises from associating Waits with
any commercial advertising at all, given his stance on artistic
integrity and commercials. But it perfectly illustrates the
problem with attempting to address moral rights and personhood
violations by using alternative theories that do not take the
personal interests of artists into consideration, let alone
prioritize those interests.
3.

Rejection of the “Signature Song” Basis for Trademark
Infringement

Courts have acknowledged that songs can function as a
trademark to signal the source of a good or service.171 Such song
marks include not only advertising jingles specifically written for
a commercial campaign, but also preexisting songs that become
associated with a single product or service source through use
over time.172 Yet, even while acknowledging that a signature
song—meaning one that a “widespread audience associates with
false endorsement based on use of multiple Beastie Boys songs for eighty percent of
the commercial, in conjunction with use of the group’s name); Henley, 733 F. Supp.
2d at 1168 (“Plaintiffs cannot maintain a Lanham Act claim based purely on the use
of Henley’s songs.”). For a hybrid-basis, where allegations that the defendants used
both copyrighted recordings and sound-alikes for a social media celebrity’s
endorsement of singer Beyoncé’s single “Formation” and the related tour, see Estate
of Barre v. Carter, No. 17-1057, slip op. at 2 (E.D. La. July 25, 2017).
170
See Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1167 (“Where an advertisement mimics a
celebrity’s voice to endorse a product, a customer may be understandably confused
as to whether the celebrity is actually endorsing the product. However the mere use
of the celebrity’s prior performance does not present the same sort of confusion.”).
171
See Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 61 (“For many decades it has been commonplace for
merchandising companies to adopt songs, tunes and ditties as marks for their goods
or services, played in commercials on the radio or television.”).
172
A ready example of a preexisting song being used as a trademark is “Like a
Rock,” written and sung by Bob Seger, which became associated with Chevy trucks
through Chevrolet’s repeated use of the songs in its truck commercials from 1991 to
2004. See Beastie Boys, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 453.
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the performing artist”173—can indeed come to signify a single
source instead of just the song itself, courts have consistently
rejected claimed trademark rights in songs as a source identifier
for the entertainment services of the music vocalist who
popularized the song in the first place.174
The justification for refusing to recognize song marks for
services of vocalists, as was articulated by the Second Circuit in
Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., has little to do with trademark law
and everything to do with preserving copyright law as the means
for controlling economic exploitation of music compositions and
sound recordings:
We cannot say it would be unthinkable for the trademark law to
accord to a performing artist a trademark or service mark in her
signature performance . . . . But for a court now to “recognize”
the previously unknown existence of such a right would be
profoundly disruptive to commerce. Numerous artists who
could assert claims similar to Gilberto’s would bring suit
against entities that had paid bona fide license fees to all known
holders of rights. Indeed, artists who had licensed users under
their copyrights and had received fees for the copyright license
could bring suits claiming additional compensation for
infringement of trademark rights.
Immense unforeseen
liabilities might accrue, upsetting reasonable commercial
expectations. We can see no justification for now altering the
commercial world’s understanding of the scope of trademark
rights in this fashion.175

And so, Gilberto was left without any recourse because Frito-Lay
had paid $200,000 for license to use the master.176

173
The Second Circuit defined a “ ‘signature performance’ ” as one “that a
widespread audience associates with the performing artist,” and acknowledged that
“[m]any famous artists have recorded such signature performances that their
audiences identify with the performer.” Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62.
174
See id. at 62 (citing Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711,
712–13 (9th Cir.1970) (where court rejected a “claim by singer Nancy Sinatra that
song she sang ‘has been so popularized by [Sinatra] that her name is identified with
it; that she is best known by her connection with the song [and] that said
song . . . has acquired a secondary meaning’ such that another person could not sing
it in a commercial”)); cf. Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1054 (C.D.
Cal. 2004) (“Rebirth of Slick (Cool Like Dat)” “has become the ‘signature song’ for
Digitable Planets, closely associated with the group and the members of the group.”).
See also Beastie Boys, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 453 (“[A]n artist’s ‘signature performance’
cannot establish a trademark signifying that artist.”).
175
Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62–63.
176
Id. at 58.
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The Oliveira court’s rationale echoed the Ninth Circuit’s
concern some thirty years prior to the Oliveira case, when, at a
time prior to federal copyright protection for sound recordings,
the court denied all relief to recording artist Nancy Sinatra, of
“These Boots Were Made for Walking” fame, on a claim for
passing off under California unfair competition law against the
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, seeking injunctive relief and
damages for essentially the same scenario for which Waits
successfully sued Frito-Lay twenty years later. 177 Sinatra
claimed that the song had acquired secondary meaning, and
alleged that Goodyear had intentionally passed off the services of
others as the service of Sinatra. 178 Without holding that there
was no secondary meaning, the Ninth Circuit reasoned as
follows:
Here, the defendants had paid a very substantial sum to the
copyright proprietor to obtain the license for the use of the song
and all of its arrangements. The plaintiff had not sought or
obtained the same rights which would have protected the
secondary meaning she asserts . . . . [T]he inherent difficulty of
protecting or policing a “performance” or the creation of a
performer in handling copyrighted material licensed to another
imposes problems of supervision that are almost impossible for
a court of equity.
An added clash with the copyright laws is the potential
restriction which recognition of performers’ “secondary
meanings” places upon the potential market of the copyright
proprietor. If a proposed licensee must pay each artist who has
played or sung on the composition and who might therefore
claim unfair competition-performer’s protection, the licensee
may well be discouraged to the point of complete loss of interest.
Finally, . . . to allow unfair competition protection where
Congress has not given federal protection is in effect granting
state copyright benefits without the federal limitations of time
to permit definite public domain use.179

177
See Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 717–18 (affirming summary judgment). Goodyear
had modified the lyrics and used the music to Sinatra’s signature song “These Boots
Were Made for Walking” for a widespread radio and television advertising campaign
for its new “wide boot” tires, and resorted to hiring singers to imitate Sinatra’s voice,
performance style, and mannerisms when it could not hire Sinatra for the
commercials. Id. at 712–13.
178
Id. at 712.
179
Id. at 717–18 (footnote and citation omitted).
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Thus, we can add to the historic concern about copyright conflict
or preemption, judicial concerns about overextending unfair
competition law in a way that undercuts predictability of the
familiar copyright licensing scheme and a concern about how to
manage, enforce, or police performer rights if some are
recognized.180
B. Tort Theory: Right of Publicity and Misappropriation of
Voice Claims
The distinction in the false endorsement context between use
of sound-alikes, which are held to implicate persona, and use of
actual voice via recordings, which are held not to do so, has
carried over to claims sounding in tort.181 As a result, courts
have held that right of publicity and misappropriation of voice
claims are preempted by copyright law, rendering them
ineffective as an alternative means of providing redress for
violation of a music vocalist’s personhood rights.182
Such was the case when recording artist Debra Laws
asserted a common law misappropriation of voice claim and a
California statutory right of publicity claim against Sony Music
Entertainment for using samples of her recorded performance
from her signature hit, “Very Special,” throughout the song “All I
Have” by Jennifer Lopez and L.L. Cool J, without her
permission.183 Laws had recorded “Very Special” in 1981, while
under contract with Elektra, which owned the copyright in the
master.184 Sony had licensed the samples from Elektra. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of both claims, holding that
“federal
copyright
law
preempts
a
claim
alleging
misappropriation of one’s voice, when the entirety of the
allegedly misappropriated vocal performance is contained within
a copyrighted medium.”185 The court further held that “the right

180

See id.; see also Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62–63.
Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
182
See, e.g., id. at 1056–57 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (dismissing right of publicity claim
based on Target’s use of the group Digable Planets’ recorded performance of their
signature song “Cool Like Dat” in Target commercial campaign as preempted).
183
See Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. (Laws II), 448 F.3d 1134, 1135–36 (9th
Cir. 2006); Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. (Laws I), 294 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1161
(C.D. Cal. 2003).
184
See Laws II, 448 F.3d at 1136; see also Laws I, 294 F. Supp. 2d at 1161.
185
Laws II, 448 F.3d at 1141 (“Sony was not imitating ‘Very Special’ as Laws
might have sung it. Rather, it used a portion of ‘Very Special’ as sung by Debra
Laws.”).
181
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of publicity is not a license to limit the copyright holder’s rights
merely because one disagrees with decisions to license the
copyright,” and reiterated its earlier reasoning in Sinatra
regarding concerns about subjecting copyright licensees to suit by
performers.186
In other instances where music vocalists sought relief from
objectionable uses of their recorded performances via right of
publicity or misappropriation of voice theories, their claims have
been hampered by language in a New York statute that expressly
excludes liability for use of name, likeness, or voice of artists in
connection with their musical productions that have been sold or
disposed of.187 On this basis, rape survivor Connie Francis was
deprived of relief from Universal’s use of her signature hits in its
film, notwithstanding her personal objections to the violent and
sexual nature of the film.188 Francis’ claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress was also dismissed, but on the
ground that Universal “did not act extremely or outrageously,
but in conformity with its contract,”189 illustrating, again, judicial
priority for the licensee’s contractual rights to the detriment of
artist personhood rights.
The effect of the exception language in the New York right of
publicity statute is antithetical to the mandated moral right
under the WPPT, which is supposed to ensure that the artist
retains control and protection of personhood rights even after
sale of the economic right(s).190
C. Compromised Reliability of Contract Theory
Ideally, the ability to negotiate limitations on the use and
exploitation of a copyrightable work should encompass an ability
186

Id. at 1145 (citing Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 718
(1970) and opining that “[i]t is hard to imagine how a copyright would remain
meaningful if its licensees were potentially subject to suit from any performer
anytime the copyrighted material was used”).
187
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS Law § 51 (McKinney 2018) provides:
But nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to prevent any
person, firm or corporation . . . from using the name, portrait, picture or
voice of any author composer, or artists in connection with his literary,
musical or artistic productions which he has so or disposed of with such
name, portrait, picture or voice used in connection therewith.
188
Franconero v. Universal Music Corp., No. 02 Civ. 1963, 2003 WL 22990060,
at *1, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2003).
189
Id. at *3 (holding that “[w]here the defendant had a proper business motive
for its actions, intentional infliction claims will not lie”).
190
WPPT, supra note 90, at art. 5.

2018]

IN LIEU OF MORAL RIGHTS

499

to protect moral rights of the author of the work.191 However,
contract theory as a stand-in for express provision of moral rights
is compromised on two levels.
First, the use of contracts in this manner relies upon the
author having sufficient bargaining power to successfully
negotiate such limits on the use and exploitation of the work.
However, most music vocalists simply do not have the requisite
leverage to extract such limits when entering into recording
contracts that transfer copyright ownership and related
exploitation rights for the artist’s sound recordings to the record
labels.192
Second, even where authors are able to negotiate for
limitations on the exploitation of transferred works, contract
theory is unreliable. Referring back to Gilliam, the plaintiffs’
copyright infringement claim was based on ABC’s production and
broadcasting of an unauthorized derivative work.193 Although
ABC had permissibly licensed use of the recordings for broadcast
from BBC, the court held that ABC was nonetheless liable for
infringement because any license from BBC to edit the
recordings had exceeded the scope of the license between the
scriptwriters and BBC, making the sub-license from BBC void.194
Thus, contract theory helped to enforce the negotiated bounds of
BBC’s copyright in the recordings and did not shield licensees
from liability. But for Debra Laws, the Ninth Circuit held that to
the extent that Laws had enforceable, contractual limitations on
Elektra’s use of its copyright in her sound recordings, that is
requiring her permission for licensing “Very Special,” her remedy
was against Elektra for breach of contract and not against Sony
as Elektra’s licensee.195

191
See, e.g., Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1392 n.10 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[U]nder
copyright law, while a licensor has no ‘moral right’ to control the quality of licensed
depictions, she may insist, contractually, on approval provisions to ‘assure quality
control and high standards in the exploitation’ of her creative work.”).
192
See Chisolm, supra note 2, at 291, 300, 305, 307, 311.
193
Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1976).
194
Id. at 20–21.
195
Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2006).
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V. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FILL THE GAP IN PROTECTIONS
AGAINST HARMS TO PERSONHOOD INTERESTS OF MUSIC
VOCALISTS
In a prior article, this author proposed an amendment to
§ 102 of the Copyright Act to add a licensable, but otherwise
inalienable copyright for music vocalists in their music
performance as an “applied music composition,” and an
amendment to § 106 to limit the derivative use of sound
recordings in accordance with the scope of the music performance
copyright.196
The prior article focused on the proposed
amendments as a solution to primarily economic inequities, and
it explained why copyright law must be the vehicle to address
those inequities.197 This Part demonstrates how the proposed
amendments could fill the gap in protections against harms to
personhood, without unreasonably hindering the economic rights
of non-performer sound recording copyright owners. It also
demonstrates how the proposed amendments would enhance the
United States’ compliance with its obligations under the WPPT
to provide coexistent, mutually exclusive rights to reproduce,
distribute, publicly perform, and commercially rent the
performers’ fixed performances and the sound recording
copyright owners’ sound recordings.
Adopting the proposed amendments would eliminate the
copyright conflict and copyright preemption concerns presented
by attempted use of noncopyright law claims fill the gap of
missing moral rights in our copyright regime.
A.

Scope of Proposed Copyright in “Applied Music Composition”

This author proposes to recognize the music vocalist’s
auditory performance as a discrete, copyrightable work—the
applied music composition—under § 102(a), whenever the
performance satisfies the threshold requirement for original
creative contribution.198 Upon fixation of the performance, a
copyright in the applied music composition would vest in the
music vocalist, just as the initial fixing of a composition vests the
196

As mentioned in Part I, the amendments that are further discussed here
were first proposed in a related article which focused primarily on addressing
economic inequities for music vocalists. Chisolm, supra note 2, at 330–33.
197
See generally id. at 320–28.
198
Id. at 330 (noting that “[t]he existing body of case law provides the necessary
benchmark for determining whether the minimum threshold for original creativity is
satisfied”).
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composition copyright in the songwriter/composer. Similarly,
“allowable forms of fixation for the applied music composition
would be . . . either notated copy, or non-audio digital files, or a
phonorecord,  ״and acceptable deposit copies “would be any of
these three for registration as a work of performing arts, or a
phonorecord for simultaneous registration, where ownership of
the sound recording and applied composition are the same.”199
Further, repeating here what was originally proposed,
The copyright bundle for the applied composition should include
all rights available under Section 106, which are the rights:
(i) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies and
phonorecords; (ii) to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work; (iii) to distribute copies or phonorecords of
the copyrighted work to the public by sale to other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (iv) to perform the
copyrighted work publicly by any means (whether live or by
playing or broadcast of recorded or live performances, as well as
by digital transmission); and (v) to display the work
publicly. . . .
Once fixed, the applied composition would be protected beyond
any sound recording encompassing the audio performance,
subject to a compulsory mechanical license, just as compositions
are treated. The compulsory license would allow any other
person to lawfully make and distribute copies/phonorecords of
the resulting musical structure embodied by the applied
composition, if that person’s primary objective is distribution to
the public for private use. Modified statutory royalties would
apply to enable compensation for composers and vocalists where
applicable.
In the instance where the composer is the
performer, the modified royalty would collapse to the original
composer royalty scheme.200

Allowing the proposed applied music composition copyright
to coexist with, but otherwise be separate from, the copyright in
the sound recording provides a means of compliance with WPPT
Article 8(1), which requires that “[p]erformers shall enjoy the
exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public
of the original and copies of their performances fixed in
phonograms through sale or other transfer of ownership,” as well
as with WPPT Articles 9 and 10, which require that performers

199

Id. at 331.
Id. The further discussion of a sample statutory royalty split explained in the
prior article is omitted here.
200
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“enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the commercial
rental . . . . and the making available to the public” of their fixed
performances.201
Moreover, including the derivative work’s exclusive right as
part of the copyright bundle for this new right is imperative,
because it is that part of the bundle that enables the performer to
assert and protect the right of integrity contemplated by WPPT
Article 5(1). “U.S. authors who hold the derivate right may
prevent modifications to their work that run [counter] to
their . . . sensibilities, without any need to show consumer
deception or harm to reputation[,]” 202 as would be required on a
Lanham Act or defamation claim, respectively.
B. Duration of Proposed “Applied Music Composition” Copyright
The duration of the applied music composition copyright
should match the duration of all other individually held
copyrights under the copyright law.
Such a duration is
consistent with Article 5(2) of WIPO’s WPPT, which requires that
“[t]he rights granted to a performer in accordance with [Article
5,] paragraph (1) shall, after his death, be maintained, at least
until the expiry of the economic rights.”203
C. Restriction on Right to Make Derivative Works of Sound
Recordings
This author also proposes a restriction on the right to make
derivative works from sound recordings in two respects.
First, derivative works from sound recordings would require
using the integrated whole, and not allow vocals to be isolated
from the sound recording for separate use. The purpose of this
restriction is:
[T]o curtail the ability of the record label and non-featurevocalist joint authors of the sound recording (i.e. producers,
sound engineers, back-up vocalists, etc.) to create or license
others to create derivative works of the sound recording that
make use of the vocalist’s audio performance isolated from the
contributions of the back-up vocalists, musicians, and/or sound
engineer.204
201

WPPT, supra note 90, at arts. 8(1), 9(1).
Netanel, supra note 54, at 43 (“The derivative right . . . is essentially
coterminous with at least the negative aspect of the integrity right.”).
203
WPPT, supra note 90, at art. 5(2).
204
Chisolm, supra note 2, at 332.
202
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Parties desiring to use the featured vocalist’s isolated
recorded performance would have to seek permission from the
vocalist, as owner of the applied music composition copyright,
instead of from the record label, as owner of the sound recording
copyright. This restriction is consistent with the objective of joint
work authorship because joint authors must intend for their
contributions to “be merged into inseparable [and]
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”205
Second, the sound recording copyright owner’s right to make
or license derivative works from the sound recording would be
subject to consent from the vocalist, as owner of the applied
composition copyright. This proposed “restriction recognizes the
applied composition as a musical work and not merely a recorded
performance. It also affords the music vocalist more control over
the content (political, artistic, or otherwise) with which the sound
recording may be associated by later licensing and use.”206
The notion of requiring multiple permissions for exploitation
of a work is already ingrained in the United States copyright
regime. Use of sound recordings has always required permission
from the owner of the underlying composition copyright. The
requirement of one more permission should pose no obstacle to
exploitation of sound recording, especially when the music
vocalist(s) holding the right would be easily identifiable and
likely as easy to locate for purposes of effecting the transaction.
A marginal increase in exploitation transaction costs to account
for directing passive income to the music vocalist is justified,
where third party interest in using the work stems from the
applied music composition rather than just the bare music
composition. Such an increase would likely still represent a
savings over the cost of the third party having to arrange for and
record a new performance of the bare music composition for the
third party’s intended use.

205
206

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “joint work”).
Chisolm, supra note 2, at 332–33.
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D. Inalienability vs Alienability of the “Applied Music
Composition” Copyright
1.

The Rationale for Inalienability, Subject to
Contemporaneous License

Consistent with a true monist perspective on copyrights, the
applied music composition would include personhood protections
“rolled into” the economic rights elements of the copyright. And
as the German Copyright Act has demonstrated is possible, the
economic interest elements of the applied music composition
copyright should be licensable, but otherwise the copyright
should be inalienable for a number of reasons. Moreover, the
license should be contemporaneous with the requested use,
rather than a blanket advance license.
First, making the new right completely alienable or subject
to advance licensing would subject its worth to “the same
bargaining power imbalances and result in the same inequities”
that music vocalists currently experience regarding ownership of
the sound recording copyright, and thus accomplish nothing
meaningful.207 Second, and conversely, “[m]aking the new right
inalienable would eliminate ownership claims under the workfor-hire doctrine, since, by definition, the applied composition
copyright could only vest in the vocalist.”208 Third, the concept of
inalienability is critical to the personhood paradigm for
copyright.
According to Professor Justin Hughes, “[n]ot only does
Hegel’s personality [justification] theory pose no inherent
objection to this kind of alienation of intellectual property, it also
provides affirmative justifications,” including the economic wellbeing of the author; payments for use of the work equate to
recognition of the author’s control of the work and the generation
of “income facilitates further expression.”209 Notably, in arguing
that personhood “theory provides a better, more direct
justification for the alienation of intellectual property, especially
copies,” which enable dissemination of the author’s expression,
Professor Hughes identifies the creator’s receipt of public
207
See id. at 330 (arguing that “[t]he new right should be inalienable . . . for the
same reasons the termination rights under §§ 203 and 304 [of the Copyright Act] are
inalienable,” i.e. to avoid “the same inequities that result when an artist does not
know ‘the true monetary value of their works prior to commercial exploitation’ ”).
208
Id.
209
Hughes, supra note 21, at 349.
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identification—that is the moral right of attribution—and
protection of the work “against any changes unintended or
unapproved by the creator”—the moral right of integrity—as
essential conditions to the justification of alienation.210
In sum, while the strictest interpretation of inalienability
requires an absolute prohibition against any separation of rights
from the author, prohibiting waiver and assignment while
allowing licenses is consistent with even the strict monist
perspective illustrated by German copyright law. It is apparent
from the express language of the WPPT that alienability of
economic rights, with inalienability of moral rights is indeed
contemplated, so the proposed inalienability of the applied
composition copyright provides the “means of redress for
safeguarding” the moral rights mandated by Article 5(1), without
having to expressly grant moral rights.211
2.

The Effects on Sound Recording Copyrights

The U.S. copyright regime expressly embraces unlimited
alienability of each exclusive right in the copyright bundle
enumerated in § 106 of the Copyright Act. 212 “The principle of
unlimited alienability requires that an author be free to assign,
license, and waive each of these exploitation rights.”213 Some
might even argue that alienability furthers the utilitarian goal of
ensuring dissemination of copyrightable works. As Netanel
explained,
Under the utilitarian model, the widespread dissemination of
intellectual works is as important a goal of copyright as is their
creation. Since dissemination is accomplished by publishers and
distributors, rather than authors, copyright is designed as much
to protect the publisher’s investment in bringing a work to
market as it is to give the author an incentive to produce. Thus,

210

Id. at 350.
United States Convention World Intellectual Property Organization
Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 5(3), May 20, 2002, S. Treaty Doc. No.
105-17.
212
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (“Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of
copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize” the
enumerated rights described) (emphasis added); id. § 204 (providing for transfers to
copyright ownership by operation of law or by written instrument signed by the
rightsholder or an authorized agent).
213
Netanel, supra note 54, at 1.
211
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since the Statute of Anne of 1710, the English predecessor to
U.S. copyright law, statutory copyright privileges have been
accorded to authors’ assigns as well as to authors themselves.214

However, in a framework such as the music industry, when the
investments advanced by record labels for production, marketing,
and distribution of the copyrighted sound recordings are onehundred percent recoupable from the recording artist,215 the
rationale for favoring absolute alienability and subordination of
the recording artist’s personhood rights and reward is not
compelling.
It is precisely because a recording artist does not receive
passive income—royalties—until reaching recouped status that
the economic incentive for the artist, as author of the applied
music composition, to encourage, authorize, and enable
distribution and exploitation of the sound recordings embodying
the applied music composition would be as strong as that of the
recording label holding the copyright in the sound recording. The
artist and the label both benefit from recouping the costs of
masters production and promotion via record sales and
derivative use. In that way, the economic interests of the
recording artist and the record label are the same and,
presumably, those interests diverge only where the personhood
interests of the recording artist are in conflict. Thus, it would be
in the best interest of the artist to minimize withholding
authorization for derivative works in the absence of serious
compromises to the artist’s personhood interests. Recording
contracts could be read to impose a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing with respect to artists’ contemporaneous consent to
exploitation of the masters. Copyright misuse would serve as an
additional check against unwarranted interference with the
label’s ability to recoup its investments.
Accordingly, making the applied music composition
copyright an inalienable right belonging solely to the featured
music vocalist(s), subject only to licensing of the economic rights
of exploitation, would not hinder economic exploitation as the
courts have speculated. To the contrary, the inalienability of the
moral rights elements would ensure the alienability of the
economic rights elements by serving as the prophylactic measure
against harmful exploitation.

214
215

Id. at 11.
See PASSMAN, supra note 41, at 74–82.
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Finally, the proposed amendments are consistent with what
the Committee on Foreign Relations contemplated: parallel
rights that “may be exercised separately by the performers and
producers” such that “[p]ermission from both the performer and
the producer must be obtained for a third-party” to exploit the
phonogram,216 subject to legislated domestic limitations, such as
fair use, and other restrictions.217
CONCLUSION
Compliance with WPPT requires the United States to enact
laws that vindicate music performers’ moral rights of attribution
and integrity, as this Article has demonstrated that continued
reliance on existing domestic laws is simply unfounded. Actual
compliance with WPPT and Article 6 of the Berne Convention is
a true necessity as continued technological progress and
globalization combine to all but eliminate meaning and effect of
territorial bounds for creation and exploitation of intellectual
property.
In demonstrating the inefficacy of contract, tort, and unfair
competition law as substitutes for an explicit grant of the moral
right of integrity or other protections for personhood rights, Part
IV identified recurring themes of copyright conflict or
preemption, resistance to changing predictability of ingrained
industry licensing practices, and perceived challenges to
managing, enforcing, and policing additional performer rights, if
some are recognized. The proposed new rights and restrictions
directly address these concerns.
While the United States may never incorporate an express
provision of the mandated moral rights of attribution and
integrity for all authors of creative works into U.S. copyright law,
or any other statutory law, this Article has shown that such
codification is unnecessary, with respect to music vocalists, if the
proposed amendments are adopted.

216

See WCT & WPPT Exec. Rept., supra note 111, at 9.
See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–122 (providing various limitations on
exclusive rights); United States Convention World Intellectual Property
Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 16, May 20, 2002, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 105-17.
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